Utah State University

DigitalCommons@USU
All Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate Studies

5-2011

The Adoption of Computer Security: An Analysis of Home
Personal Computer User Behavior Using the Health Belief Model
Chester L. Claar
Utah State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd
Part of the Management Information Systems Commons

Recommended Citation
Claar, Chester L., "The Adoption of Computer Security: An Analysis of Home Personal Computer User
Behavior Using the Health Belief Model" (2011). All Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 878.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/878

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open
access by the Graduate Studies at
DigitalCommons@USU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in All Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@USU. For
more information, please contact
digitalcommons@usu.edu.

THE ADOPTION OF COMPUTER SECURITY: AN ANALYSIS OF HOME
PERSONAL COMPUTER USER BEHAVIOR USING
THE HEALTH BELIEF MODEL
by
Chester L. Claar
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
Education
(Management Information Systems)
Approved:

_______________________
Dr. Jeffrey J. Johnson
Major Professor

________________________
Dr. David J. Paper
Committee Member

_______________________
Dr. Zsolt G. Ugray
Committee Member

________________________
Dr. Kelly J. Fadel
Committee Member

_______________________
Dr. Jean M. Lown
Committee Member

_______________________
Dr. Byron R. Burnham
Dean of Graduate Studies

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Logan, Utah
2011

ii

Copyright © Chet L. Claar 2011
All Rights Reserved

iii
ABSTRACT

The Adoption of Computer Security: An Analysis of Home Personal Computer
User Behavior using the Health Belief Model
by
Chester L. Claar, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 2011
Major Professor: Dr. Jeffrey Johnson
Department: Management Information Systems
The primary purpose of this research was to examine the adoption of computer
security software in the home computer environment. The use of the Health Belief Model
as a framework to design a model to examine home user adoption of computer security
provided the basis for this research.
The method of the investigation was a cross-sectional study using a self-reported
web-based survey to test the theoretical model derived from the Health Belief Model. The
survey targeted individuals who are responsible for the selection, installation, and
maintenance of software on their home computers. The data collection relied on a
snowball sampling technique that recruited a total of 186 participants who completed the
online survey.
The research model contains a total of 26 hypothesized relationships that were
tested using multiple regression analysis techniques. The research model contains six
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main predicting variables (perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, perceived benefits,
perceived barriers, self-efficacy, and cues to action) and four moderating variables (age,
gender, education, and prior experience of attack). The model explains 30.4% of the
variance in computer security usage, the dependent variable in the research model.
The results demonstrate that certain constructs found in the Health Belief Model
are more effective than others in motivating individuals to utilize computer security
software. Specifically, the results show that perceived vulnerability (H1), perceived
barriers (H4), self-efficacy (H5), and the two-way interactions of age and barriers (H8d),
education and benefits (H9c), prior experience and perceived severity (H10b), and prior
experience and self-efficacy (H10e) had significant effects on computer security usage.
Additionally, prior experience was found to have a significant main effect on the
dependent variable.
Information from this research provides evidence that the Health Belief Model
can be used to study the computer security usage behavior of home computer users.
Further, the relationship of perceived vulnerability and computer security usage provides
a way for practitioners to increase computer security usage behavior through targeted
media campaigns.

(149 pages)
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The phenomenal growth of the Internet has brought many new and exciting
opportunities to the home computer user. Shopping, banking, communication with
friends and relatives, access to sources of information for research and homework,
entertainment sources, up-to-the-minute weather and news, and countless other possible
online activities have made the Internet indispensable for most online-enabled
households.
However, while providing these new opportunities for home users, the Internet
has also provided an opportunity-rich environment for criminals and others with
malicious intent. They seek to exploit computer users who do not adequately protect
themselves from the ever-increasing number of cyber threats.
In June 2009 the U.S. Census Bureau released the most recent statistics from a
population survey collected November 2007. These statistics show there are over 72
million households in the United States with Internet access. Considering that these
households must have at least one computer connected to the Internet, and sometimes
more, this equates to at least 72 million potential targets for Internet borne attacks. Using
computer security solutions available in the form of anti-virus, anti-spyware, and firewall
software can provide effective protection from these online threats. However, there are
many home computer users who are not adequately protecting themselves using these
software solutions (America Online & National Cyber Security Alliance, 2005).
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The behavioral antecedents of adoption and use of computer security solutions of
home computer users is the focus of this research. When examining behavioral
antecedents, perceived vulnerability in online activities would be an appropriate aspect to
examine when trying to understand adoption and usage behavior for computer security
solutions. Additionally, the severity of a security incident to the user is an important user
perception to examine in an effort to better understand adoption behavior. Focusing this
research on the individual home computer contributed to a better understanding of
computer security adoption behavior.
Problem Statement
The problem is that many home computer users neglect to use even the most basic
computer security solutions available even with the current threat of numerous types of
security exploits present in online computing activities. Reasons for this behavior have
yet to be satisfactorily explained.
Purpose Statement
The primary purpose of this research was to explore the factors that affect the
adoption of computer security. No research was found in the Information Systems (IS)
adoption literature that adequately identifies the factors that affect computer security
adoption. As a result, this research asserts that current models used in technology
acceptance research do not adequately reflect the factors affecting acceptance and usage
of computer security in the home environment. The predominant Management IS
research models tend to focus on technologies that promote positive outcomes and offer
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the user some sort of utility. However, computer security software is classified as a
protective technology, which is strictly designed to avert negative outcomes and offers
little obvious utility.
In an attempt to resolve the absence of adequate MIS models for security
adoption, this study examined the effectiveness of the constructs found in the Health
Belief Model, a healthcare model from outside the IS domain. Using the Health Belief
Model may facilitate better determination of behavioral antecedents that affect the
acceptance and usage of protective technologies. The Health Belief Model examines the
protective healthcare measures individuals take to protect themselves from health
problems and disease. The nature of these health related preventative actions are very
similar to the use of computer security software, a protective technology that can be used
to secure the home computer from threats possibly encountered during online computing
activities.
Conceptual Framework
The theoretical framework used in this research to study the adoption and usage
of computer security on home computers is adapted from a behavioral model called the
Health Belief Model. The Health Belief Model is a natural choice for adaption to this
study because it examines protective measures in general and is one of the founding
conceptual frameworks used to study and explain many types of healthcare behavior. The
Health Belief Model includes explanatory factors not found in IS adoption models that
this research posits to be important in computer security acceptance and usage. The
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constructs of perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, and cues to action are also not
present in the predominant IS adoption models.
Research Objectives
This research examines the behavioral antecedents involved in adoption and usage
behavior for computer security on home computers. The two research objectives are:
1. Explore the relationships between behavioral antecedents and adoption and usage
of computer security by computer users on their home computers.
2. Expand the body of knowledge of the information security domain using a
framework based on the Health Belief Model.
Overview of Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. This introduction provides a general
overview of the research topic, the research questions, and the document in general.
Chapter 2 provides the literature review. This chapter reviews the theoretical and
empirical literature pertaining to security, information technology adoption, and health
care behavior research.
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical model with specific hypotheses that will be
tested in this research. The constructs used in the model and hypotheses are developed
and defined. The constructs used in this research adapted from the Health Belief Model
include the perceptions of vulnerability, severity, benefits, barriers, and self-efficacy, and
the motivational construct cues-to-action. The model also includes the demographic
moderators of gender, age, and education as well as the moderating relationship of prior
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attack experience. Finally, the dependent variable, security software usage, is taken from
the security literature.
Chapter 4 discusses the survey research methodology used in this study. The
design of the research is described and the rationale for this approach is presented.
Additionally, the research constructs are designed and operationalized.
Chapter 5 describes the full data collection and survey procedures, the validation
of the measurement instrument used, and the analysis and results of the study.
Chapter 6 discusses the results, conclusions, limitations, and the implications of
the results of this study for both research and practice.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This chapter provides a literature review of information security and two research
domains that are relevant to this study: technology acceptance theories and health
behavior theories/research.
Information security is a complex topic. For this research the foundations of the
need for information security measures on the home PC can be broken down to the areas
of the threats encountered while on the Internet and the mitigation techniques available to
protect computing resources from these threats. The first section of this literature review
will develop these concepts to justify the need for security precautions.
To capture the conceptual theory of technology acceptance research, an overview
of the seven most prominent user behavior models was completed. These are the (a)
Theory of Reasoned Action, (b) Theory of Planned Behavior, (c) Technology Acceptance
Model, (d) Unified Theory of Acceptance and Usage of Technology, (e) Model of
Adoption of Technology in Households, (f) Model of PC Utilization, and (g) Innovation
Diffusion Theory.
The final research area is based on health behavior research that stems from the
health care field. Health behavior theory has been used for years to measure the success
of health promotion measures. This overview covers the conceptual foundation of the two
theories that have been applied to the MIS domain: The Health Belief Model, which
provides the foundation for this research, and the Protection Motivation Theory.
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Information Security
Internet borne attacks can take many forms. One form is email based, such as
spam and phishing schemes designed to get users to reveal confidential data. Other attack
types result in infections, such as computer viruses designed to cause damage. Trojan
Horses are designed to create back doors or spread viruses or spyware, while computer
worms are designed to spread themselves as rapidly as possible, creating network
disruptions. These programs, designed to compromise computers, are collectively
referred to as “malware.”
While some malware programs are designed to immediately cause noticeable
interference with the normal operations of an infected computer, the more common and
insidious type of malware is spyware, which silently resides on the host machines to steal
private data stored on the computer, or to watch and report online activity looking for
details about bank accounts, credit card numbers, and login and password information for
a variety of exploitations.
Often these malware programs also initiate the host computer into a botnet, a
network of similarly infected computers all under the control of an unknown individual,
called a botmaster. Either for their own agendas, or for rent, botmasters can use
compromised computers (also called zombies) to email spam, gather personal data, store
and distribute illegal material, attack other computers and networks, or use them to
launch attacks to cripple the critical infrastructures of nations such as power grids,
telecommunications, commerce, or government services (Grizzard, Sharma, Nunnery,
Kang, & Dagon, 2007; Rajab, Zarfoss, Monrose, & Terzis, 2006).
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U.S. Strategic Command Chief General James E. Cartwright reported to Congress
in March 2007 that "America is under widespread attack in cyberspace." During fiscal
year 2007, the Department of Homeland Security received 37,000 reports of attempted
breaches on government and private systems, which included 12,986 direct assaults on
federal agencies and more than 80,000 attempted attacks on Department of Defense
computer network systems. Most of these attacks were launched using zombie computers
to mask the true source (Tkacik, 2007).
Cyber criminals are continuing to refine their attack methods to remain
undetected and to create global, cooperative networks to support the ongoing growth of
criminal activity (Symantec Corporation, 2007). A study by MacAfee Avert Labs
reported that in the first quarter of 2009 over 12 million new machines worldwide had
been assimilated into botnets. That equates to an infection rate of 4 million new
computers infected per month. The United States was responsible for 18% of all newly
infected machines during that time. Overall, the United States accounts for 35% of all
zombie machines under the control of spammers. This same study also reported that the
number of unique viruses found in March 2009 was nearly double that found in any
month in the previous year. This trend indicates that the threat continues to grow at an
ever-increasing rate (McAfee Avert Labs, 2009). According to Symantec Corporation,
these patterns of attack will continue to increase as the financial payoff for compromising
individual data increases (Symantec Corporation, 2007).
The continued success of exploits is directly related to a failure of many computer
users to adequately protect their systems with available computer security solutions.
America Online and the National Cyber Security Alliance conducted a survey of Internet
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users in the United States in order to assess their level of security awareness and good
practice (America Online & National Cyber Security Alliance, 2005). Study participants
were interviewed and then computer specialists examined their computers for common
security issues. Based upon a sample of 329 homes, the study discovered several
disturbing facts about security measures on respondents’ computers.
The AOL/NCSA study revealed that approximately 75% of all respondents feel
that their computer is very safe from online attack or from viruses. Thus, 84% of
respondents keep sensitive information on their computer and 72% use their computers
for sensitive transactions. During the examination of the respondents’ systems by
computer specialists, it was revealed that 15% had no anti-virus software installed and
that 67% had not updated it within the previous week. The study also revealed that 19%
of these computers had an active viral infection and that 63% had been the victims of a
previous viral infection. The study also discovered that fully 67% of computers had no
firewall software installed, and 72% of computer with firewalls installed did not have the
firewall properly configured.
With the approximately 72 million households currently on the Internet, the
percentages of inadequately protected computers represented by the AOL/NCSA study
equate to tens of millions of vulnerable computers in the United States that are potential
victims, and attackers, in the online world of the Internet. With the possibility of these
infected machines being used to disrupt or destroy critical infrastructures and disrupt vital
services, also known as a cyber-apocalypse, the necessity of determining the factors
involved in the adoption of computer security solutions becomes clear. Four studies were
found during a review of existing literature that provided foundational information for

10
this research study using the Health Belief Model. These studies represent efforts to bring
security research to the level of the individual user. Three of these studies focus on the
computer user within the organizational setting while the last is the only study found to
focus on the computer user within the home environment.
Liang and Xue (2009)
Liang and Xue (2009) stated, “Avoidance and adoption are two qualitatively
different phenomena and that technology acceptance theories provide a valuable, but
incomplete, understanding of users’ IT threat avoidance behavior” (p. 71). Liang and Xue
(2009) further stated, “Although a number of studies have investigated IT security at the
organizational level, few efforts have been made to establish an overarching paradigm to
guide theory development and to provide a common frame of reference at the individual
user level” (p. 72). They constructed a new theoretical model based on extant literature
from the fields of psychology, health care, risk analysis, and information systems. Named
the Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT), this model attempts to explain
individual IT users’ threat avoidance behavior.
The TTAT contains several core constructs. The TTAT contains a threat appraisal
and a coping appraisal as antecedents of the coping process, which is problem-focused
and/or emotion-focused. The two antecedents of perceived threat are perceived
susceptibility and perceived severity. Perceived susceptibility is the individual’s belief of
the risk of a security incident actually happening to them. Perceived severity is the
individual’s perception of the negative consequences of such an occurrence.
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The three antecedents of perceived avoidability are perceived effectiveness,
perceived costs, and self-efficacy. Perceived effectiveness measures the individual’s
belief of the ability of the safeguard to avoid the threat. Perceived costs are the
“individual’s physical and cognitive efforts that are needed to use the safeguarding
measure such as time, money, inconvenience, and comprehension” (Liang & Xue, 2009,
p. 82). Self-efficacy is the individual’s confidence in implementing the safeguard
measure.
The coping process can be problem based in which the individual judges whether
the threat is avoidable, or unavoidable. In situations where the threat is avoidable, a
problem based coping strategy is employed to undertake safeguarding measures to
protect information resources. In an unavoidable situation, the individual may use an
emotion based coping strategy in which they accept the fact that they will be
compromised by a security threat and choose not to implement a safeguard as doing so
would be a useless effort. The TTAT can be seen in Figure 1. Presented as a theoretical
model only, there was no empirical evidence as to the effectiveness of the TTAT to
explain the individual IT users’ threat avoidance behavior.
Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu (2009)
In a study conducted by Ng, Kankanhalli, and Xu (2009), the researchers used the
Health Belief Model, adapted from the healthcare literature, to study users' computer
security behavior. The authors believe that the current predominating models of
Information Systems adoption represent positive technologies in which there is a tangible
benefit from the use of the technology of study. They contend that the use of computer
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Figure 1. Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (Liang & Xue, 2009).
security software represents a protective technology in which the adoption of the
technology is designed to prevent undesirable consequences. This study makes use of the
Health Belief Model by drawing on the similarities between preventative healthcare
behavior and computer security software usage.
Core constructs. The model contains six main predictors (perceived
susceptibility, perceived benefits, perceived barriers, cues to action, general security
orientation, and self-efficacy) and one moderating variable of perceived severity, and the
dependent variable of security behavior using email. Perceived susceptibility refers to the
individual’s perceived risk of a security related incident. Perceived benefits refer to an
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individual's beliefs regarding the relative effectiveness of an action to reduce the security
threat. Perceived barriers refer to the cost or inconvenience of taking a recommended
security precaution. Cues to action are events that instigate the recommended action.
Examples of triggering events include media reports of new security threats, social
influence in the form of knowledge of others having security problems, and
recommendations from experts. General security orientation is the users’ predisposition
and interest in taking proper security precautions. Self-efficacy is the individual’s selfconfidence in his/her skills or ability in taking recommended security precautions.
Perceived severity is an individual’s belief concerning the seriousness of being afflicted
with a particular security problem. The research model used in this study can be seen in
Figure 2.
Results. The model was tested using survey data from 134 employees in an
organizational setting. The results (R2 = 0.593) show that perceived susceptibility,
perceived benefits, and self-efficacy are determinants of email related security behavior.
The results also demonstrate that perceived severity moderates the effects of perceived
benefits, general security orientation, cues to action, and self-efficacy on security
behavior. The model used in the Ng, et al. (2009) research differs from the HBM in that
the construct of general security orientation has been added to the basic HBM model.
Additionally, the authors modeled perceived severity as a moderating variable when in
the HBM this construct is modeled as an antecedent of the health related behavior.
However, results this study demonstrates that the Health Belief Model can be used to
study computer use behavior in a security context.
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Figure 2. Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu Research Model (Ng, et al., 2009).
Boss, 2007
In an effort to better understand the individual computer user behavior with
computer security in an organizational setting, Boss (2007) constructed a research model
based on organizational control and the fear of crime. The research model examines the
relationship between the elements of control (specification, evaluation, and reward), risk
elements and risk antecedents (direct experience, indirect experience, and risk) and
precautions that can be taken at the individual level which are motivated by
organizational policies and procedures (Boss, 2007).
Core constructs. The research model contains one dependent variable of security
precautions taken. Perceived manditoriness and risk perceptions comprise the two main
antecedents of precautions taken. Perceived mandatoriness is the “individuals’

15
perceptions that that compliance with existing security policies and procedures is
compulsory within the organization” (p. 74). Mandatoriness has three antecedents of
specification, evaluation, and reward. Specification “measures the individual perceptions
of the existence of corporate policies and/or procedures dealing with computer security”
(p. 68). Evaluation “measures the individual perceptions that managers sift through,
organize, and analyze collected data to reach a conclusion regarding individual
compliance with the specified policies and procedures” (p. 69). Reward “measures the
degree to which individuals feel that they are rewarded for compliance with required
security policies and procedures” (p. 70). Risk perceptions is defined as “the degree to
which an individual feels that he is likely to experiencing a cyber-attack and the impact to
him were it to happen” (p. 75). Risk perception has two antecedents of direct and indirect
experience with computer related incidents. The research model can be seen in Figure 3.
Results. A field survey was administered in a large organization where 1,738 total
responses were collected from a population of 3,500. The research model was tested
using Partial Least Squares (PLS) Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) and the overall
model results (R2=0.41) support that specifying security policies are effective in
increasing perceived mandatoriness, which motivates individuals to take security
precautions. The results also demonstrate that both direct and indirect experience have a
significant positive effect on perceptions of risk, but risk perceptions do not have any
effect on the level of precautions taken by individuals (Boss, 2007).
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Figure 3. Boss Research Model (Boss, 2007).
Conklin, 2006
In a study conducted by Conklin (2006), the primary purpose was to construct a
model to analyze the computer security usage behavior in the home environment. This
study represents the first attempt to study this particular segment of the security software
user population. Conklin (2006) based the research model for this research the Diffusion
of Innovation (DoI) theory. Conklin (2006) stated, “Diffusion of Innovation Theory (DoI)
is a broad based, general theory to describe the adoption of new or innovative ideas in
response to a perceived need of their utility” (p. 18).
Core constructs. Following the framework outline by Rogers (1975), Conklin’s
model has five main constructs (Adopter Characteristics, Characteristics of Innovation,
communications channels, social consequences of adoption, and the adopter decision
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process). The adoption decision represent the dependent variable in this research and is
measured as intent to use security software. Adopter characteristics are the individual
traits that influence a computer users intention with respect to security measures. The
characteristics that Conklin (2006) measured in this research were the risk tolerance
based on the type of computer use and risk awareness of the user to potential security
incidents based on their usage behavior, and the perceived self-efficacy of implementing
security measures, as well as the general computer self-efficacy perception. Conklin
(2006) states that, “perceived characteristics of a particular innovation are important to
the adoption of the innovation Characteristics of the innovation” (p. 62). Conklin (2006)
measured this construct through the use of the perceived suitability of the recommended
security solution, the perceived effectiveness of the security solution, and the perceived
complexity of implementing the recommended security solution. The construct of
Communication Channels refers to the sources of information individuals are exposed to
about computer security software. The sources that Conklin used in this construct are
information from news sources, friends, work, and software/hardware vendors. The
construct of social consequences of adoption refers to the negative experiences that the
user has either directly had with security incidents, or has personal knowledge of through
others that the individual believes are important. The adopter decision process, the
dependent variable in this study, is measures in the perceived importance of using
computer security software, and the intent to use computer security software. The
research model can be seen in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Security Diffusion Model (Conklin, 2006)
Results. The population of home computer users was surveyed using an online
survey distributed using a snowball sampling method. The survey yielded 356 usable
surveys which were analyzed using a LISREL based SEM method. Results of the study
indicate that goodness of fit indices for the overall model were within the acceptable
guidelines. Specifically, the results show that the constructs of suitability, risk awareness,
perceived importance, vendor based communication channel, and subjective norm were
identified as important antecedents of computer security usage behavior.
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Technology Acceptance Research
This section includes an overview of seven prominent behavior research models
(Theory of Reasoned Action, Theory of Planned Behavior, Technology Acceptance
Model, Unified Theory of Acceptance and Usage of Technology, Model of Adoption of
Technology in Households, Model of PC Utilization, Diffusion of Innovation Theory)
and a selection of the published articles pertaining to these models.
Theory of Reasoned Action
The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) originates from the field of social
psychology. Developed by Fishbein & Ajzen in 1975, the theoretical foundation of TRA
is that behaviors are best indicated by intentions and those intentions are formed jointly
from the constructs of subjective norms and a person’s attitude (Fishbein and Ajzen,
1975). In 1988, Sheppard, Hartwich, and Warshaw performed a meta-analysis of TRA
studies (30 different studies with 11,566 participants) and determined there was strong
correlation between intentions and actions (Sheppard, Hartwich, & Warshaw, 1988). In
1989 Davis, Bagozzi, and Warshaw applied TRA to the study of individual acceptance of
technology and found that the variance explained was largely consistent with previous
studies using TRA to model behavior (Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989). Other MIS
researchers have applied the TRA and have also concluded that the TRA effectively
models behavior in the IS domain (Karahanna, Straub, & Chervany, 1999; Taylor &
Todd, 1995b).
The TRA is based on two core constructs, the attitude towards the behavior and
the subjective norm. The attitude toward behavior is defined as “an individual’s positive
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or negative feelings (evaluative affect) about performing the target behavior” (Fishbein &
Ajzen, 1975, p. 216). The subjective norm construct is based on “the person’s perception
that most people who are important to him think he should or should not perform the
behavior in question” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 302). These two core constructs are
both direct influencers of behaviors as shown in Figure 5.
The TRA is based on one’s attitude toward the behavior combined with the
perception of those who are important to the person and how these constructs influence
the end-user behavior. The simplistic, yet effective nature of TRA has provided the
foundation for models using additional factors to help explain variance in specific cases
of behavioral research. Extensions of TRA come in many forms and the core constructs
of TRA can be seen in most predominant MIS models in use today.

Figure 5. Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980).
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Theory of Planned Behavior
The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) is an extension of the TRA (Ajzen, 1991).
This extension is through the addition of a construct to represent perceived behavioral
control on the part of the individual making decisions. This extension is used to increase
the predictive power of TRA with only a minor decrease in parsimony. This extension is
to cover issues that account for conditions where users do not have complete control over
their actions. Therefore, TPB is considered more specific than TRA (Hu & Chau, 1999).
TPB has been used in numerous studies that have successfully predicted intention and
subsequent behavior in a wide range of settings (Harrison, Mykytyn, &
Riemenschneider,1997; Mathieson, 1991; Taylor & Todd, 1995b). The value of
subjective norm in organizational settings and adoption of IT has been shown to be
significant (Hartwick & Barki, 1994). In 2005, a study revealed that in some cases TPB
has accounted for up to 50% of variance of intention (Morris, Venkatesh, & Ackerman,
2005).
The TPB contains several core constructs. The constructs of attitude and intention
are directly adapted from the TRA. The subjective norm construct of represents the
degree to which an individual is swayed by their perception of how people they respect
believe they should act. The construct of perceived behavioral control added in the TPB
represents the individual’s perception of the level of difficulty the individual perceives is
associated with the behavior.
The addition of subjective norm and perceived behavior control are used to
account for individual’s beliefs that their actions are not totally under their own control,
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Figure 6. Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991).
or at least that they will consider other factors outside themselves before making a
decision (Taylor & Todd, 1995b) Figure 6 illustrates the relationships between the
constructs.
Technology Acceptance Model
The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) was developed by Davis in 1989 to
predict the acceptance and usage of information technology in work environments
(Davis, 1989). TAM has been used in a wide variety of studies and has been shown to be
useful in predicting behavioral intentions with respect to the adoption and usage of
technology (Al-Gahtani, 2001; Benamati & Rajkumar, 2002; Chau, 1996; Dishaw &
Strong, 1999; Gefen, Karahanna, & Straub, 2003; Hu & Chau, 1999; Malhotra &
Galletta, 1999; Moon & Kim, 2001; Rose & Straub, 1998; Straub, Keil, & Brenner,
1997). The TAM model is heavily cited and is one of the most influential models in IS.
At the time of this research, 6228 articles had cited the Management Information Systems
Quarterly (MISQ) article written by Davis in 1989.
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Several meta-analysis articles have been published analyzing the TAM model
(Dennis, Wixom, & Vandenberg, 2001; Ma & Liu, 2004). Ma and Liu found over 100
empirical articles, from which they selected 26 that matched their criteria for article
selection. They reviewed articles that contained a correlation coefficient or other statistics
that could be converted to a correlation coefficient. They concluded that the TAM model
can be used to predict IT usage but that ease of use is not a strong predictor of intent.
However, usefulness was shown to predict intent, and ease of use was correlated with
usefulness. The TAM model has been widely researched and empirically tested across
many different domains. The main premise of TAM is that the perceived usefulness and
perceived ease of use of a technology will directly correlate with how technology is
accepted and used in the work environment.
The TAM consists of two constructs: perceived usefulness and perceived ease of
use. Perceived usefulness is defined as the “degree to which a person believes that using a
particular system would enhance his or her job performance” (Davis, 1989, p. 320).
Perceived ease of use is defined as the “degree to which a person believes that using a
particular system would be free of effort” (Davis, 1989, p. 320). The premise behind the
TAM model is that a user’s perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use of the
technology will influence the amount of actual use of technology. The relationship of the
constructs can be seen in Figure 7.
Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology
In 2003 Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, and Davis presented a new theory of technology
acceptance that synthesized previous research, which they named the Unified Theory of
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Figure 7. Technology Acceptance Model (Davis, 1989).
Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT).
The goal of UTAUT was to build upon the available models in use at the time to
better explain user intentions to use an IS and subsequent usage behavior. The theory
holds that four key constructs - performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social
influence, and facilitating conditions - are direct determinants of usage intention and
behavior (Venkatesh et al., 2003).
Gender, age, experience, and voluntariness of use are hypothesized to mediate the
impact of the four key constructs on usage intention and behavior (Venkatesh et al.,
2003). The theory was developed through a review and incorporation of the best
performing constructs of eight models that earlier research had employed to explain IS
usage behavior (Theory of Reasoned Action, Technology Acceptance Model,
Motivational Model, Theory of Planned Behavior, a combined Theory of Planned
Behavior/Technology Acceptance Model, Model of PC Utilization, Diffusion of
Innovation theory, and Social Cognitive Theory). Empirical validation of the UTAUT
model through the use of a longitudinal study has shown that significant levels of
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explained variance (nearly 70%) in usage intention are explained by the model
(Venkatesh et al., 2003).
Core constructs. The UTAUT model contains four antecedents of adoption and
four moderating variables. The antecedents are facilitating conditions, performance
expectancy, effort expectancy, and social influence. The factor facilitating conditions is
associated with items related to organizational and infrastructure elements that support
adoption. The facilitating conditions construct is similar to the perceived behavioral
control construct found in the TPB (Azjen, 1991) and the compatibility construct found in
the Diffusion of Innovation theory (Rogers, 2003). Performance expectancy is related to
items that would lead to a perceived increase in job or task performance. Foundations of
performance expectancy include the constructs of perceived usefulness from the TAM
(Davis, 1989), and relative advantage from the Diffusion of Innovation theory (Rogers,
2003). Effort expectancy is related to factors that the adopter would perceive as affecting
ease of use, including perceived ease of use from the TAM (Davis, 1989) and complexity
from the Diffusion of Innovation theory (Rogers, 2003). Social influence is a construct
similar to the construct of social norm from the Technology Acceptance Model (Davis,
1989) and the image construct from the Innovation Diffusion theory (Rogers, 2003).
These four factors are antecedents to user behaviors, with four additional constructs
acting as moderators. Figure 8 illustrates the relationship between these constructs and
the moderating factors (Venkatesh et al., 2003).
The moderating factors are gender, age, experience, and voluntariness of use.
Gender and age are new constructs with respect to previous studies. Experience is related
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Figure 8. Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (Venkatesh et al., 2003).
to self-efficacy and originates in Social Cognitive Theory (Compeau & Higgins, 1995).
Voluntariness of use of the technology is a construct that reflects the amount of choice
the user of the technology has in its adoption. Voluntariness has been shown to account
for some influence in overall usage (Hartwick & Barki, 1994; Rogers, 2003).
Previous research. The Unified Theory of Acceptance and Usage of
Technology seminal article has been cited by many other researchers since it was
introduced in 2003. Currently UTAUT has been cited by over 1,800 other articles.
Research domains that have applied the UTAUT model include acceptance of assistive
robots (Heerink, Krose, Evers, & Wielinga, 2006), computer security usage (Appunn,
2008), ERP implementations (Tao, Lee, & Liu, 2005), mobile devices (Carlsson,
Carlsson, Hyvönen, Puhakainen, & Walden, 2006; Ristola, Koivumaki, & Kesti, 2005),
organizational learning in health systems (Doktor, Bangert, & Valdez, 2005), online
banking (Al-Somali, Gholami, & Clegg, 2009; Cheng, Liu, Qian, & Song, 2008; Liu,
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Huang, & Zhu, 2008), personal innovativeness (Rosen, 2004), usage of web systems (Li
& Kishore, 2006; Wang & Yang, 2005), and wireless communications (Anderson &
Schwager, 2004; Han, Mustonen, Seppanen, & Kallio, 2005; Knutsen, 2005; Lin, Chan,
& Jin, 2004).
Model of Adoption of Technology in Households
Created in 2001 by Venkatesh and Brown, the Model of Adoption of Technology
in Households (MATH) represents a major shift for MIS research. Up to this point
research on technology adoption had been focused on organizations, or on individuals
within organizations. However, this recent exploration of technology adoption in
households was studied using personal computer adoption within the home (Venkatesh &
Brown, 2001).
Core constructs. The research model used in this study grouped the antecedents
to behavioral intent in three groups: attitudinal beliefs, normative beliefs, and control
beliefs. In the group of attitudinal beliefs are the antecedents of application for personal
use, utility for children, utility for work-related use, applications for fun, and social
outcomes. In normative beliefs, the constructs are friends and family influences,
secondary sources’ influences, and workplace referents’ influences. Control beliefs
included fear of technological advances, declining cost, perceived ease of use, and
requisite knowledge. The MATH was later extended to add Household Life Cycle by the
original researchers (Brown & Venkatesh, 2005; Brown, Venkatesh, & Bala, 2006 ). A
representation of the constructs and their relationships can be found in Figure 9.
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Previous research. The Model of Adoption of Technology in Households
represents a relatively new adoption model and therefore not much research has been
conducted using the MATH model as a foundation. While the recency of the model may
account for a significant lack of follow-up research, there are more recent models with
much higher acceptance and usage. The focus on the adoption of technology in the home,
which until this study was largely ignored, remains an area of little interest to most
researchers. As such, this article has only been cited approximately 260 times.
A review of these articles has revealed that this research has been used to support
the concepts of hedonistic outcomes (Tractinsky, 2004), fear of obsolescence (Choi,
Choi, Kim, & Yu, 2005; Porter & Donthu, 2006), appreciation of associated benefits
(Anckar, Carlsson, & Walden, 2003) and in reviews of existing theories, as an extension
to the Theory of Planned Behavior (Dewan & Riggins, 2005).
This model is being included in this literature review as it is the first major effort
to analyze the adoption of technology in the household. While not a major influencer in
current MIS research, it provides the first recognition that technology adoption research
in the home is a viable and valuable research area to explore.
Model of PC Utilization
The model of PC utilization (MPCU) was developed by Thompson, Higgins, and
Howell in 1991. This model was derived largely from the Theory of Human Behavior
(Triandis, 1980). The MPCU presents a competing perspective to that proposed by TRA
and TPB. Thompson et al. (1991) adapted and refined Triandis’ model for IS contexts
and used the model to predict PC utilization. However, the nature of the model makes it
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Figure 9. Model of Adoption of Technology in Households (Brown & Venkatesh, 2005)
particularly suited to predict individual acceptance and use of a range of information
technologies (Venkatesh, et al., 2003).
Core constructs. The model measures actual usage instead of intention, and
consists of six independent variables (Job-fit, Complexity, Long-term Consequences,
Affect Towards Use, Social Factors, and Facilitating Conditions) and one dependent
variable (actual use) (Thompson et al., 1991). Job-fit is defined as “the extent to which an
individual believes that using [a technology] can enhance the performance of his or her
job” (Thompson et al., 1991, p. 129). Complexity is based on Rogers and Shoemaker
(1971) and is defined as “the degree to which an innovation is perceived as relatively
difficult to understand and use” (Thompson et al., 1991, p. 128). Long-term
Consequences is defined as “outcomes that have a pay-off in the future” (Thompson et
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al., 1991, p. 129). Affect toward use is based on Triandis (1980) and is defined as
“feelings of joy, elation, or pleasure, or depression, disgust, displeasure, or hate
associated by an individual with a particular act” (Thompson et al., 1991, p. 127). Social
Factors is also derived from Triandis (1980) and are defined as “the individual’s
internalization of the reference group’s subjective culture, and specific interpersonal
agreements that the individual has made with others, in specific social situations”
(Thompson et al., 1991, p. 126). Facilitating Conditions are objective factors in the
environment that observers agree make an act easy to accomplish. Thompson et al.
defines facilitating conditions as “provision of support for users of PCs may be one type
of facilitating condition that can influence system utilization” (Thompson et al., 1991, p.
129). A pictorial representation is illustrated in Figure 10.
Previous research. The MPCU model has been cited 598 times, which shows
that it has been used by many researchers. Most notably the MPCU was one of the
founding models used in the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Usage of Technology
(Venkatesh et al., 2003).

Figure 10. Model of PC Utilization (Thompson et al., 1991).
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Examples of research that has applied the MPCU include computer self-efficacy
(Compeau & Higgins, 1995), perceived ease of use (Gefen & Straub, 2000; Karahanna &
Struab, 1999; Venkatesh, 2000), the role of prior experience (Taylor & Todd, 1995a),
electronic markets (Liang & Huang, 1998), personal computer utilization (Thompson,
Higgins, & Howell, 1994), technology use and performance (Lucas & Spitler, 1999), and
the Technology Acceptance Model (Lee, Kozar, & Larsen, 2003).
Diffusion of Innovation Theory
Originally created by Everett Rogers in 1964 and based on extant theories in
sociology and communications, the Diffusion of Innovation theory has been used for over
40 years to study a variety of innovations from different fields (Rogers, 2003). Diffusion
of Innovation theory describes how an innovation is communicated over time to potential
adopters. Diffusion of Innovation theory was developed to explain the factors that
influence adopters with respect to adoption of a specific innovation. Innovations
represent something new, such as a new tool, a new method, or some other change
perceived as valuable or useful to the adopter. Diffusion is a communication process
where information about an innovation is communicated over a period of time across a
social system. Individual adopters, using the information, can make a decision whether or
not to adopt the innovation (Rogers, 2003).
Core constructs. Rogers described five elements that characterize diffusion
(Rogers, 2003). One construct of the DoI theory is the innovation, which is defined as
something that is perceived as new or different to the adopter (Rogers, 2003). Another
construct of the DoI theory is the decision making process that occurs when individuals
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consider a new idea. The potential adopter weighs the advantages and disadvantages of
using the innovation and decides whether to adopt or reject the innovation. The third
construct of the DoI theory is the characteristics of individuals that make them likely to
adopt an innovation. Not all adopters will adopt technology at the same rate, or at all.
While some people readily adopt innovations, others adopt them more slowly and some
adopt only if forced to do so. Rogers has described five classes of adopters; innovators,
early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards (Rogers, 2003). The fourth
construct of the DoI theory is the consequences for individuals and society associated
with adopting an innovation. This can be defined as the consequences resulting from
failure. The last construct of the DoI theory is the communication channels used in the
adoption process. This construct is defined by the social communication networks
involved in the adoption process. These networks are used to spread information between
potential adopters from a wide variety of sources. Figure 11 illustrates the relationship
between these constructs.
Previous research. One of the primary strengths of the DoI theory is its broad
applicability across numerous disciplines and innovations. In 1996, research by Moore
and Benbasat demonstrated support for the predictive value of the DoI framework in
informations systems research (Moore & Benbasat, 1991). Additional researchers have
demonstrated the applicability of DoI to individual adoption in IS (Agarwal & Prasad
1997, 1998; Karahanna, et al., 1999; Plouffe, Hulland, & Vandenbosch, 2001).
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Figure 11. Diffusion of Innovation Theory (Rogers, 1995).
Summary – Technology Adoption Research
The current predominant models in IS used to examine user adoption and usage
behavior are the Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), the Theory of
Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991), the Technology Acceptance Model (Davis, 1989), the
Unified Theory of Acceptance and Usage of Technology (Venkatesh et al., 2003), the
Model of Adoption of Technology in Households (Brown & Venkatesh, 2005), the
Model of PC utilization (Thompson et al., 1991), and the Innovation Diffusion Theory
(Rogers, 2003). These MIS research models tend to focus on technologies that promote
positive outcomes and offer the user some sort of utility. However, computer security
software is classified as a protective technology, which is strictly designed to avert
negative outcomes and offers little obvious utility (Conklin, 2006; Ng et al., 2009). None
of these models address the problem of adoption when utilized for reason of protection,
rather than utility.
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Health Behavior Research
This section includes an overview of two prominent health behavior research
models (Health Belief Model and the Protection Motivation Theory) and a review of the
published articles pertaining to these models.
Health Belief Model
The Health Belief Model (HBM) is a psychological model that attempts to explain
and predict protective health behaviors. This is done by focusing on the attitudes and
beliefs of individuals. The HBM was first developed in the 1950s by social psychologists
Hochbaum, Rosenstock, and Kegels, working in the U.S. Public Health Services
(Hochbaum, 1958). The model was developed in response to the failure of a free
tuberculosis health-screening program. Since then, the HBM has been adapted to explore
a variety of long- and short-term health behaviors. The HBM is based on the
understanding that a person will take a health-related action if that person feels that a
negative health condition can be avoided, has a positive expectation that by taking a
recommended action they will avoid a negative health condition, and believes that they
can successfully take a recommended health action (Rosenstock, 1974).
The original HBM contained four core constructs representing the perceived
threat and net benefits: perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, perceived benefits,
and perceived barriers. These concepts were proposed as accounting for people's
"readiness to act." An additional concept, cues to action, would trigger that readiness and
stimulate behavior (Rosenstock, 1966, 1974). An addition to the HBM in 1988 by
Rosenstock, Strecher, and Becker is the perceptual concept of self-efficacy, which is
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one's confidence in the ability to successfully perform an action (Bandura, 1977). The
core constructs of the HBM are outlined below.
Perceived susceptibility. Personal risk or susceptibility is one of the more
compelling perceptions in motivating people to adopt healthier behaviors. The greater the
perceived risk, the greater the likelihood of engaging in behaviors to decrease the risk.
Perceived seriousness. The construct of perceived seriousness is defined as an
individual’s belief about the seriousness or severity of a disease. While the perception of
seriousness is often based on medical information or knowledge, it may also come from
beliefs the person has about the difficulties a disease would create or the effects it would
have on his or her life in general.
Perceived benefits. The construct of perceived benefits is a person’s perception
of usefulness of a new behavior in decreasing the risk of developing a disease. People
tend to adopt healthier behaviors when they believe the new behavior will decrease their
chances of developing a disease (Rosenstock, 1966).
Perceived barriers. The construct of perceived barriers is an individual’s
perception of the obstacles in the way of adopting a new behavior. Janz and Becker
suggested in 1984 that of all HBM constructs, perceived barriers are the most significant
in determining behavior change (Janz & Becker, 1984).
Self-efficacy. In 1988, self-efficacy was added to the original four perceptual
constructs of the HBM (Rosenstock, Strecher, & Becker, 1988). Self-efficacy is the belief
in one’s own ability to do something (Bandura, 1977). People generally do not attempt
something new unless they perceive a fair chance of success.
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Cues to action. In addition to the five beliefs or perceptions, the HBM suggests
that behavior is also influenced by cues to action. Cues to action are events, people, or
things that move people to change their behavior. Examples include illness of a family
member, media reports (Graham, 2002), symptoms of illness, advice from others,
reminder postcards from a health provider (Ali, 2002), or health warning labels on a
product.
Modifying variables. The five major constructs of perception (susceptibility,
seriousness, benefits, barriers, and self efficacy) are modified by other variables that have
been labeled socio-demographic factors. These include demographic variables (gender,
age, education level, income, race, ethnicity, etc.), socio-psychological variables
(personality, social class, peer and reference group pressure, etc), and structural variables
(knowledge about the disease, prior contact with the disease, etc.). These variables
represent individual characteristics that influence personal perceptions. A visual
representation of the Health Belief Model is in Figure 12.
Previous research. The HBM has been used in numerous research studies
covering a variety of medical conditions, detection screenings, and prevention
techniques. Examples of research using the HBM can be found in research relating to
HIV, AIDS, and sexually transmitted disease prevention (Belcher, Sternberg, Wolotski,
Halkitis, & Hoff, 2005; Lewis & Malow, 1997; Rose, 1995; Yep, 1993), various cancers,
(Burak & Meyer, 1997; Byrd, Peterson, Chavez, & Heckert, 2004; Champion, 1993;
Champion & Menon, 1997; Ellingson & Yarber, 1997; Frank, Swedmark, & Grubbs,
2004; Graham, 2002; Lamanna, 2004; Mullens, McCaul, Erickson, & Sandgren, 2003;
Umeh & Rogan-Gibson, 2001; Weinrich et al.,1998), diabetes (Forsyth & Goetsch,
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Figure 12. Health Belief Model (Rosenstock, Strecher, & Becker, 1994)
1997), heart disease (Ali, 2002), and vaccinations (Chen, Fox, Cantrell, Stockdale, &
Kagawa-Singer, 2007; de Wit, Vet, Schutten, & van Steenbergen, 2005).
In the area of IS research, only one study using the HBM was found. However,
the model used in this study was modified from the original HBM as it did not include
the modifying socio-demographic variables of gender age, ethnicity, etc. Additionally,
the perceived seriousness (perceived severity) construct was used as a moderator on the
other constructs (Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009). In the HBM, perceived seriousness was
modeled as a main predictor of behavior and not as a modifying construct.
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Protection Motivation Theory
The Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) was originally proposed to provide
conceptual clarity to the understanding of fear appeals (Rogers, 1975). A later revision of
PMT extended the theory to a more general theory of persuasive communication, with an
emphasis on the cognitive processes mediating behavioral change (Rogers, 1983).
The PMT is partially based on the work of Lazarus (1966) and Leventhal (1970)
and describes adaptive and maladaptive coping with a health threat as a result of a threat
appraisal and a coping appraisal, in which the behavioral options to diminish the threat
are evaluated (Boer & Seydel, 1996). The appraisal of the health threat, and the appraisal
of the coping responses, result in protection motivation, which is the intention to perform
adaptive responses, or may lead to maladaptive responses, which are those that place an
individual at health risk. They include behaviors that lead to negative consequences and
the absence of behaviors, which eventually may lead to negative consequences. Since the
output of these appraisal-mediating processes is the decision to initiate, continue, or
inhibit the adaptive responses, the dependent variables in research on PMT are typically
measures of behavioral intentions (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). The purpose of PMT
research is usually to persuade people to follow the communicator’s recommendations, so
intentions indicate the effectiveness of the attempted persuasion.
Core constructs. Threat appraisal is based on the perceived vulnerability, which
is the estimation of the chance of contracting a disease, and perceived severity, which is
an estimation of the seriousness of a disease on the individual’s life. Coping appraisal
consists of response efficacy, which is the efficacy of the recommended preventive
behavior, and self-efficacy, which is the level of confidence in one’s ability to undertake
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the recommended preventive behavior. Response efficacy is the individual’s expectancy
that carrying out recommendations can remove the threat. Self-efficacy is the belief in
one’s ability to execute the recommend courses of action successfully. Protection
motivation is a mediating variable whose function is to arouse, sustain, and direct
protective health behavior (Boer & Seydel, 1996). The relationships of the constructs can
be seen in Figure 13.
Previous research. The Protection Motivation Theory can be used for
influencing and predicting various behaviors. PMT has been used to study health
behavior in a variety of health-related topics.
These topics include asthma (Mesters, Meertens, Kok, & Percel, 1994) cancer
screening and prevention (Myers et al., 1994; Seydel, Taal, & Wiegman, 1990; Sutton,
Bickler, Sancho-Aldridge, & Saidi, 1994), depression (Self & Rogers, 1990), drug and
alcohol use (Epstein, Botvin, Diaz, & Toth, 1995; Stainback & Rogers, 1983), exercise
(Fruin, Pratt, & Owen, 1992; Wurtele & Maddux, 1987), HIV/AIDS/STD (Ahia, 1991;
Basen-Engquist, 1994), muscular dystrophy (Flynn, Lyman, & Prentice-Dunn, 1995), and
smoking (Ho, 1992; Rogers & Deckner, 1975).

Figure 13. Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers, 1975).

40
The PMT is well suited to studying protection behaviors outside the health care
field. Within 15 years of its inception, PMT had been applied to over 30 different
domains, both inside and outside the health-related contexts (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn,
1997). Protection motivation theory has been applied to research in IS by various
researchers to study information security (Cheneweth, Minch, & Gattiker, 2009; LaRose,
Rifon, & Enbody, 2008; Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007; Weirich & Sasse, 2001;
Woon, Tan, & Low, 2005; Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008). Protection Motivation
Theory has been used in these studies to examine the effectiveness of fear appeals or
recommendations that a suggested course of action be followed to avert negative
consequences.
Summary of Literature Review
The issue of information security adoption on home computers is an important
research topic for MIS researchers. The current MIS adoption models tend to emphasize
constructs that measure an expected utility to the adopter. Since information security
software offers little obvious utility, the problem of security adoption must be approached
in a different manner (Conklin, 2006).
There are remarkable similarities between the adoption of security software to
protect a home computer and the adoption of disease prevention measures in the
healthcare field. Using the Health Belief Model may facilitate better determination of
behavioral antecedents that affect the acceptance and usage of computer security
software. The choice to use HBM as a contributor to the model over the PMT is due to
the PMT being an extension of the HBM. The PMT was designed to elicit a behavioral
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response by the introduction of fear appeals. The PMT also focuses on the cognitive
process involved in the decision process. This makes PMT better suited for a mixed
method design.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH MODEL DEVELOPMENT
This chapter presents a research model and the formulation of several research
hypotheses. This study will explore the behaviors of home computer users in relation to
the security measures taken on their computers using the Health Belief Model to provide
direction in model construction. The original HBM modeled socio-demographic factors
as antecedents of Perceived Vulnerability, Perceived Severity, Perceived Benefits,
Perceived Barriers, and Self-Efficacy. For this study the socio-demographic factors are
used as moderators for the independent variables as this modification is more appropriate
to the context of this study. The chapter begins by presenting the constructs of the
research model, the theoretical foundation for their inclusion in the model, and the
associated hypotheses. The chapter concludes with a summary of the model and the
hypotheses.
Core Constructs
In this section the development of the core constructs of the research model
constructs are discussed. These constructs include perceived vulnerability, perceived
severity, perceived benefits, perceived barriers, self-efficacy, and cues to action.
Perceived Vulnerability (VUL)
In the health belief model as defined by Rosenstock (1966), the construct
perceived susceptibility refers to the “subjective risks of contracting a condition” (p. 6)
and that these perceptions vary widely from one person to another. When confronted by
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risk of disease, one individual may deny any possibility of contracting the condition,
another may recognize the statistical probability, and yet another may feel that he/she is
in real danger of contracting the condition (Rosenstock, 1966). For this research,
perceived susceptibility is an individual’s judgment of the risk of his or her computer
contracting a particular security related issue and has been renamed perceived
vulnerability for the research model. In the context of computer security, perceived
vulnerability refers to a user's perceived likelihood of the occurrence of a security
incident. When an individual perceives higher vulnerability to security incidents, he/she
will be likely to use appropriate computer security software to mitigate the risk. The
hypothesis for this construct is as follows:
H1 – Perceived Vulnerability to security incidents is positively related to
computer security usage.
Perceived Severity (SEV)
In the Health Belief Model, the construct perceived seriousness refers to a
person's perception of the seriousness of a given health problem. Perceived seriousness is
not limited to the clinical consequence of a health problem but may extend to the
implications on the individual's job security or negative effects on the individual’s family.
(Rosenstock, 1966). Though the consequences of a security incident may be severe,
individuals may have a different perception of the severity or extent of the damage a
security incident may cause on their home computers. For this research model, the
construct of perceived severity parallels the HBM seriousness construct and is defined to
be a user's perceived seriousness of a security incident and its impact on lifestyle, which
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should lead to a higher motivation to utilize computer security software. The hypothesis
for this construct is as follows:
H2 – Perceived severity of security incidents is positively related to computer
security usage.
Perceived Benefits (BEN)
In the Health Belief Model, perceived benefits refer to an individual's perceptions
of the relative effectiveness of an action to reduce the disease threat (Rosenstock, 1966).
For this research, perceived benefits refer to a user's belief in the perceived effectiveness
of using computer security software; higher perceived benefits are likely to result in
increased computer security software usage. The hypothesis for this construct is as
follows:
H3 – Perceived benefits of practicing computer security are positively related to
computer security usage.

Perceived Barriers (BAR)
The perceived barriers construct is the individual’s belief in the benefits compared
to the perceived costs of action. Although individuals may believe that a given action is
effective in reducing threat, they may find that action to be inconvenient or unpleasant to
them (Rosenstock, 1966). Analogous to preventive healthcare actions, computer security
software usage often causes inconvenience and unpleasantness through additional
controls. For this research, perceived barriers is defined as an individual’s perceived cost
and inconvenience of using computer security software, which is likely to reduce the
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motivation to utilize such software. The hypothesis for this construct is as follows:
H4 - Perceived barriers of practicing computer security are negatively related to
computer security usage.

Self-Efficacy (SEF)
Self-efficacy is another predictor of behavior in the Health Belief Model. The
roots of self-efficacy come from social cognitive theory and refer to individuals’ selfconfidence in their ability to perform a behavior to produce the desired outcomes
(Bandura, 1997). According to social cognitive theory, individuals with greater
confidence in their abilities are more likely to initiate challenging behaviors. For this
study, self-efficacy specifically refers to the belief that the individual can install,
configure, and maintain the security software on their computer, which is likely to
increase computer security behavior. The hypothesis for this construct is as follows:
H5 – Information Security Self-efficacy is positively related to computer security
usage.

Cues to Action (CUE)
When defining the Health Belief Model, Rosenstock (1966) believed that
healthcare action may not take place unless a triggering event occurs to set the process in
motion. The perceptions of susceptibility, seriousness, benefits, barriers, and self-efficacy
can create a readiness to act and that actual change often occurs when some external or
internal cue triggers action. Examples of cues to action include internal perceptions of
symptoms, impact of communications media, knowledge of someone suffering from a
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similar disease, or reminders from doctors. In this research, cues to action refer to
experiences or triggers that would motivate an individual to use computer security
software. Examples of triggering events in this research include computer symptoms
relating to attacks, media alerts of security vulnerabilities, operating system manufacture
warnings, and knowledge of other individuals experiencing security issues. A greater
number of cues to action are likely to lead to increased computer security behavior. The
hypothesis for this construct is as follows:
H6 - Cues to action are positively related to computer security usage.
Moderating Constructs
The Health Belief Model theorizes that demographic, socio-psychological, and
structural factors are antecedent influences of perceived susceptibility, seriousness,
benefits, barriers, and self-efficacy and preventive healthcare behavior. Liang and Xue
(2009) stated in their study of avoiding IT threats that “ample evidence demonstrates that
risk tolerance is a personal trait related to demographics variables including age, gender,
marital status, race, religion, education and income” (p. 84). They believed that this risk
tolerance would also direct relate to the risk tolerance and avoidance behavior of IT
users. This research will use the demographic moderators of Gender, Age, and Education
and the structural variable of prior experience with computer security attacks in a
moderated relationship between demographic and structural variables and the main
predicting variables. Moderated relationships of this nature were successfully modeled in
IS research by Venkatesh et al. (2003) in the creation of the UTAUT. These moderating
variables will be used to determine the level of impact each may have on the relationship
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between the variables vulnerabilities, severity, benefits, barriers, and self-efficacy (VUL,
SEV, BEN, BAR, SEF) and the dependent variable Computer Security Usage (SSU). The
hypotheses for these constructs are as follows:
Gender (GEN)
H7a - Gender significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived
Vulnerability and Computer Security usage.
H7b - Gender significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived Severity
and Computer Security usage.
H7c - Gender significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived Benefits
and Computer Security usage.
H7d - Gender significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived Barriers
and Computer Security usage.
H7e - Gender significantly moderates the relationship between Information
Security Self-efficacy and Computer Security usage.
Age (AGE)
H8a - Age significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived
Vulnerability and Computer Security usage.
H8b - Age significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived Severity
and Computer Security usage.
H8c - Age significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived Benefits
and Computer Security usage.
H8d - Age significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived Barriers
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and Computer Security usage.
H8e - Age significantly moderates the relationship between Information Security
Self-efficacy and Computer Security usage.
Education (EDU)
H9a - Education significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived
Vulnerability and Computer Security usage.
H9b - Education significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived
Severity and Computer Security usage.
H9c - Education significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived
Benefits and Computer Security usage.
H9d - Education significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived
Barriers and Computer Security usage.
H9e - Education significantly moderates the relationship between Information
Security Self-efficacy and Computer Security usage.
Prior Experience (PXP)
H10a - Prior Experience significantly moderates the relationship between
Perceived Vulnerability and Computer Security usage.
H10b - Prior Experience significantly moderates the relationship between
Perceived Severity and Computer Security usage.
H10c - Prior Experience significantly moderates the relationship between
Perceived Benefits and Computer Security usage.
H10d - Prior Experience significantly moderates the relationship between
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Perceived Barriers and Computer Security usage.
H10e - Prior Experience significantly moderates the relationship between
Information Security Self-efficacy and Computer Security usage.
Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented the research model and the hypotheses. The objective
of this stage in the study was to introduce the core and moderating constructs and to
develop a model of the relationships between these constructs based on the Health Belief
Model as proposed by Rosenstock (1966). The research model representing the constructs
and their relationships is shown in Figure 14. The following chapter discusses the
methodology that will be used to test these hypotheses.

Figure 14. Research model
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH METHODS AND PROCEDURES
This chapter describes the research methods and procedures that were
implemented to test the model and associated hypotheses presented in the previous
chapter. This research used a non-experimental design utilizing an Internet-based survey
to assess the proposed model and research hypotheses. This chapter presents the
population under study, survey development, operationalization of constructs, and pretest
results. Finally, the data collection method is presented.
Population
The population of interest for this study is all of the home computer users that are
at least partially responsible for the implementation and maintenance of the software on
their computers. Since this study focuses on the use of security software such as antivirus, firewall, and anti-spyware, anyone who could benefit from this software is
included in the population. The latest population statistics from the U.S. Census Bureau
show that there are approximately 72 million Internet-enabled households in the United
States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007). Most of the computer owners in this group manage
their own software installations and this research is limited to home computer users who
self-identify a responsibility for maintaining their home computer.
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Survey Development
Since the constructs found in the HBM parallel constructs that are found in other
research models, the survey used items adapted from other research on Information
Security (Boss, 2007; Conklin, 2006). The scales created in previous Information
Security research have been tested for validity and reliability. Use of previously validated
scales increases the trustworthiness of results obtained by this study. To further increase
validity, a review process was followed for scale creation. For constructs in the Health
Belief Model that had not yet been tested in the context of computer security, questions
were constructed and then reviewed for clarity and correctness with respect to computer
security and with the population of study as the intended recipients. Reviewers for this
process included Ph.D. students, professors from the field of management information
systems, undergraduate college students, and several home PC users.

Operationalization of the Constructs
The ability of the research model to test the hypothesized relationships is dependent
on the manner in which the operationalization of the constructs is performed (Straub,
1989). This section is a description of the operationalization of each of the research
constructs as used in the final data collection.
Demographics Variables
The demographic variables of gender, education, and primary operating system
were assessed using categorical response options, while age was measure using a
continuous scale. Scales were developed to ensure enough choices to obtain the
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sensitivity necessary for regression analysis. While data on primary operating system are
being collected in the pretest and main data collection, this data is strictly for
demographics and will not be used in the analysis of the research model for this study.
Operationalization of the demographic variables can be found in Table 1.
Perceived Vulnerability, Perceived Severity,
and Perceived Benefits
Perceived vulnerability is a user's perceived likelihood of a security attack on
their home computer and perceived severity refers to a user's perceived seriousness of a
security attack on their home computer. Boss (2007) used these constructs in the research
model he created to analyze security behaviors in the context of control theory.
Table 1
Demographic Variables
Variable
Gender

Question
Are you Male or Female?

Response Options
Male
Female

Age

What is your age?

1-year increments from 18 to 115 years of age.

Education

What is the highest level of
education you have
completed?

Less than High School
High School or equivalent
Some College
Career Training
2-Year College Degree (Associates)
4-Year College Degree (BA, BS)
Master's Degree
Doctoral Degree
Professional Degree (MD, JD)

Primary
Operating
System

What primary operating
system does your home
computer use?

Windows XP
Windows Vista
Windows 7
Apple OS X
Linux (Ubuntu, Red Hat, SUSE, etc)
Unix (BSD, HP, Solaris, etc)

53
Questions in his research were adapted from a USDOJ National Crime Victimization
Survey published in 2001 specific to computer fraud, virus exposure, physical
threat/obscene e-mail reception, and software copyright violation. Each item “assesses
the degree to which individuals feel that it is likely they will experience the scenario, and
assesses the impact to them were it to happen” (Boss, 2007, p. 75).
This research uses items as adapted by Boss to assess the likelihood that they will
experience a specific scenario, and assess the impact to them were it to happen. Perceived
vulnerability is measured on a 7-point Likert scale from Highly-Unlikely to HighlyLikely. Perceived severity is measured on a seven-point Likert scale from Very-Low
Impact to Very-High Impact. The Vulnerability and Severity scenarios can be seen in
Table 2.
Perceived Benefits is a user's perceived effectiveness of using computer security
software to mitigate the perceived vulnerability to a security incident. The measurements
for this construct are designed to assess the belief that implementing computer security
will prevent the scenarios presented in Table 2. These questions are assessed using a
seven-point Likert scale from Highly Disagree to Highly Agree.
Perceived Barriers
Perceived barriers refer to a user's perceived cost and inconvenience of practicing
computer security. In a study by Conklin (2006), various constructs were designed to
assess the research model constructed using the Diffusion of Innovation Theory (Rogers,
2003).
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Table 2
Security Incident Scenarios
Scenario
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Question
My computer system becoming corrupted by a virus or worm.
My computer system being taken over by a hacker.
My data corrupted by a virus or cyber-attack.
My identity stolen (credit card number, Social Security
Number, Bank account information, etc.).
My data lost due to a virus or worm on my computer.
The Internet becoming inaccessible because of computer
security problems.
Downloading a file that is infected with a virus through my email.
Downloading a file that is infected with a virus from the
internet.

One of the constructs Conklin, (2006) designed was Suitability, which was
designed to measure users’ perception of the benefits and barriers for usage of computer
security software. Of these questions he designed using a focus panel, questions relating
to the perceived barriers were adapted for use in this research. These questions are
measured with a seven-point Likert scale from Highly Disagree to Highly Agree (BAR1,
“The expense of security software is a concern for me”; BAR2, “Using security software
would change the way I use my computer”; BAR3, “Using security software effectively
is time consuming”; BAR4, “Using security software is would require considerable
investment of effort other than time”).
Self-Efficacy
Self-efficacy is a user's self-confidence in his/her skills or ability in practicing
computer security. In the study by Conklin (2006) discussed in the previous construct, the
construct of Self-efficacy Security Skills was designed to measure users confidence of
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their own ability to select, install and maintain computer security software. Conklin used
a four-item scale to assess the level of self-efficacy with computer security software.
These questions were adopted for this study as tested by Conklin. The only exception is
the rewording of the question that Conklin used to evaluate the ability to maintain
computer security software. This question was changed to assess the ability of the
individual to properly configure computer security software. Reliability and construct
validity for this adapted scale was verified during the analysis phase of this study as
reported in Chapter V.
These questions are measured on seven-point Likert scale from Not At All
Confident to Totally Confident (SEF1, “I can select the appropriate security software for
my home computer”; SEF2, “I can correctly install security software on my home
computer(s)”; SEF3, “I can correctly configure security software on my home
computer(s)”; SEF4, “I can find the information I need if I have problems using security
software on my home computer(s)”).
Cues to Action
Cues to action is the construct that that refers to experiences or triggers that would
motivate and activate a user to use computer security software. In the Health Belief
Model these cues or triggers can take the form of media reports, influences from people
the individuals knows, reminders from doctors, or a symptom related to an illness
recognized from past experience (Rosenstock, 1966). In the context of computer security
these cues can be media reports of new viruses or vulnerabilities, friends and relatives
being attacked, reminder messages from software companies, or the computer exhibiting
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unusual behavior. The questions are measured on a seven-point Likert scale from Highly
Disagree to Highly Agree (CUE1, “If a friend were to tell me of a recent experience with
a computer virus, I would be more conscious of my computer's chance of being
attacked”; CUE2, “If my computer started behaving strangely, I would be concerned it
had been the victim of a security attack”; CUE3, “If I saw a news report, or read a
newspaper or magazine about a new computer vulnerability, I would be more concerned
about my computer's chances of being attacked”; CUE4, “If I received an email from the
maker of my computer’s operating system about a new security vulnerability, I would be
more concerned about my computer's chances of being attacked”).
Prior Experience
Prior experience refers to the user’s prior experience with security incidents. The
experience with a previous illness was proposed by Rosenstock et al (1994) to moderate
the relationship between the perceptual variables (susceptibility, seriousness, benefits,
barriers, and self-efficacy) and the appropriate preventative healthcare behavior. For this
research, the prior experience construct is the individual’s past experience with computer
security incidents. In Conklin (2006), prior experience with security attacks was
measures on the basis of frequency, recency, and severity. Three questions from this pool
were selected and adapted for this research. The question to determine how frequently the
individual has been affected by a security incident is measured using a seven-point Likert
scale from Never to All the Time. The question to determine how recently the individual
has been affected by a security incident is measured using a seven-point Likert scale from
Never to Within the Last Week. The impact of a previous security incident has been
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measured on a seven-point Likert scale from Very Low/No Impact to Very High Impact
(PXP1, “How frequently have you been affected by a computer security problem?”;
PXP2, “How recently have you been affected by a computer security problem?”; PXP3,
“The level of impact I have experienced from a computer security problem is:”).
Dependent Variable
Actual Computer Security Usage, as self-reported by respondents taking the
survey, is the dependent variable of this study. Similar to the preventive healthcare
behaviors used in disease prevention research using the Health Belief Model, the use of
anti-virus, firewall, and anti-spyware software is beneficial to prevent most computer
security incidents. The usage of computer security is measured based on the percentage
of the time that individuals utilize computer security software. The scale is measured on a
seven-point Likert scale from Never to Always (SSU1, “I use add-on anti-virus software
on my home computer(s); SSU2, “I use add-on firewall software on my home
computer(s)”; SSU3 I use add-on anti-spyware software on my home computer(s)”).
Pretest
After construction of the survey items, a pretest was administered to a
convenience sample of students from different majors attending an introductory MIS
class at a major university during the Fall Semester 2009. The pretest obtained a total of
55 responses, of which all were usable in order to identify weaknesses in question
wording and analyze the reliability of the scales used. Based on relevant comments by
those that took the survey, some items were reworded to enhance understanding by
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respondents with non-technical backgrounds. The constructs operationalized in the
previous section reflect the changes to enhance participant understanding of question
intent and response options as well as a change in the scale of the dependent variable
from agree/disagree, to frequency of usage.
Respondent Demographics
Demographic information for the pretest respondents is presented in Table 3. The
demographics were consistent with an undergraduate MIS class. It is expected that for the
main data collection there will be more diversity in responses and that we should see that
gender would be approximately equal, more education levels would be represented, and
more variation would exist in the age of respondents.
Reliability
Cronbach’s alpha measures the internal consistency of the items in the factor.
The lower limit for an acceptable Cronbach’s alpha is 0.7, though 0.6 may be acceptable
for newly defined scales (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). A reliability analysis
of the constructs revealed that the target of Cronbach’s alpha of 0.7 was attained for all
theorized constructs, indicating that proceeding with the main data collection using the
items in the pretest is acceptable (see Table 4).
The low sample size of 55 was insufficient to be usable for factor analysis, which
is used to ensure that convergent and discriminate validity, subtypes of construct validity,
have been achieved. A change in the scale of the dependent variable from agree/disagree,
to frequency of usage, made a regression analysis at this stage also impractical.
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Table 3
Pretest Demographic Data
Characteristics
Gender
Male
Female

Frequency

Percent (%)

40
15

72.7
27.3

Age
18-20
21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61 or over

17
38
-

30.9
69.1
-

Education
Less Than High School
High School or Equiv.
Some College
Career Training
2 Year Degree
4 Year Degree
Master’s Degree
Doctorate Degree
Professional Degree

4
37
14
-

7.3
67.3
25.5
-

Primary Operating System
Windows XP
Windows Vista
Windows 7
Linux
UNIX
Apple OS X

12
25
5
13

21.8
45.5
9.1
23.6

Table 4
Pretest Reliability Analysis
Construct
Perceived Vulnerability
Perceived Severity
Perceived Benefits
Perceived Barriers
Self Efficacy
Cues to Action
Computer Security Usage

Number of
Items
8
8
8
4
4
4
3

Cronbach's
Alpha
0.921
0.916
0.939
0.735
0.916
0.801
0.845
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Data Collection
One of the major limitations with a target population as large as all Internet
accessing computer owners is that the target population is undefined. As such,
constructing a valid sampling frame is extremely difficult, as all members of the target
population cannot easily be identified, resulting in sampling error. Couper (2000) stated
that “sampling error arises from the fact that not all members of the frame population are
measured.” Should the selection process be repeated, a slightly different set of sample
individuals would be obtained. Coverage error is a function of both the proportion of the
target population that is not covered by the frame and the difference on the survey
statistic between those covered and those not covered (Groves, 1989). While a
statistically valid sampling frame cannot be constructed for the target population in this
study, an attempt to introduce randomness into the sampling process can be attempted.
Brown and Venkatesh (2005) sampled home users during the study of the Model
of Adoption of Technology in Households. They obtained their sample by having a
market research firm randomly select names from their database. This method was
employed to distribute email invitations to potential survey participants for this research.
A marketing firm was hired to distribute an email invitation to customers of
Internet Service Providers in the United States. Text of the email sent can be found in
Appendix A.
The result of the e-mail campaign was that of the 300,000 e-mail invitations sent,
78,555 were opened. Of those who opened the e-mail, only 69 individuals used the link to
navigate to the survey. However, no completed surveys were collected.
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Given the sensitive subject of computer security and the ongoing awareness
campaigns to warn email users about e-mail security threats, this result is not entirely
surprising. An analysis of the method of distribution, and the message sent, could lead
many to be distrustful of the invitation, resulting in nonparticipation. A method to bypass
these feelings of mistrust and get users to seriously evaluate an invitation to this research
was needed.
Snowball sampling is a non-probability technique for developing a research
sample where existing study subjects recruit future subjects from among their own social
networks. Snowball sampling can be effective in reaching members of the target
population where the members are not known, or in hidden populations where the
members of the population do not wish to be known. In this sampling method, initial
members of the target population are identified and then either asked to provide the
researchers with other possible candidates from the same population of interest or recruit
others into the research directly by providing them with participation information. In
either case, recruitment continues until the sample reaches the size necessary for data
analysis.
Snowball sampling was employed to recruit participants into the research study.
Recruitment began with members of an undergraduate class at a university in the western
United States. The survey invitations were posted to Google newsgroups chosen at
random covering various topic threads from several geographic areas in the United
States. The survey was posted to surveyshare.com and can been found in Appendix B.
Given the snowball method of invitation distribution, and the anonymous nature of the
survey collection, tracking the number of invitations sent is not possible. This website
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allows the survey to be filled out anonymously, but prevents multiple surveys from an
individual through the use of an email address to screen previous responses. A review of
the research methods used in this study was completed by the appropriate institutional
review board (IRB). The IRB certification for this study can be found in Appendix C.
Analysis of the completed surveys can be found in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
DATA ANALYSIS
This chapter presents the characteristics of the study sample, its analysis and the
results of statistical analysis. The study data set is collected using a survey distributed via
an email message with a link to the survey. The sample set as initially collected contains
186 responses. Eighteen of the surveys have missing data, and the method of dealing with
this data is detailed. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the hypotheses presented
in Chapter III.
Sample Characteristics
The beginning of the survey contained demographic variables pertinent to the
research model (gender, age, and education) as well as the demographic of primary
operating system, which only used for description of the respondents. Table 5 shows the
demographic results for gender, age, and education.
Male respondents accounted for a slightly larger portion of the respondents
(51.1%). The largest number of respondents report that their education level is “Some
College” (44.6%). The majority of respondents report that their primary operating system
is Microsoft Windows, with Windows XP the most prevalent version.
Descriptive statistics of reported age (measure on a continuous scale) show the
range of respondent ages was 18-79 with an average age of 37.3, with a standard
deviation of 17.36, skew of .60, and a kurtosis of -1.06. While these statistics would
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Table 5
Initial Sample Characteristics
Variable
Gender
Male
Female

Frequency

Percent (%)

95
91

51.1
48.9

Education
Less Than High School
High School or Equiv.
Some College
Career Training
2 Year Degree
4 Year Degree
Master’s Degree
Doctorate Degree
Professional Degree

1
16
83
8
39
22
13
2
2

0.5
8.6
44.6
4.3
21.2
11.8
7.0
1.1
1.1

Primary Operating System
Windows XP
Windows Vista
Windows 7
Apple OS X
Linux
UNIX

60
55
38
30
3
-

32.3
29.6
20.4
16.1
1.6
-

indicate a normal age distribution, a look at the histogram of respondent ages shown in
Figure 15 shows that the descriptive statistics are misleading. The histogram shows that
the distribution is bimodal with the highest peak occurring with users in the range of 2025 years of age. This is primarily the result of the snowball sampling being started
primarily with undergraduate students. However, the scatterplot of the age of respondent
shown in Figure 16 illustrates the progression of the sampling by respondent and that as
the snowball sampling continued, the sample grew more diverse in age. Had the sampling
been allowed to continue deeper into the population, the sample should have become
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Figure 15. Histogram of respondent ages

Figure 16. Scatterplot of age and respondent number.
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more normally distributed with respect to age and more representative to the target
population with respect to all demographics (Heckathorn, 1997).
Missing Data Analysis
A visual analysis of the dataset revealed two cases with excessive missing
responses. The two cases visually identified are 100 and 115. Before removing these
cases, a missing data analysis was conducted using the Missing Data Analysis module in
SPSS. The initial sample contained 186 respondents and the missing data analysis
identified 18 cases with missing data. The cases identified with missing values can be
seen in Table 6. Cases 100 and 115, which were identified visually, were removed from
the dataset. Case 100 was removed because it was missing values for all questions
relating to perceived benefits. Case 115 was removed because values were missing for
questions relating to several constructs including the dependent variable. Demographic
information for gender, education, and primary operating system for the remaining 184
respondents can be seen in Table 7. Age, which was measure on a continuous scale,
provides the best evidence that dropping the two anomalous cases outlined above did not
significantly alter the demographic profile of the respondents. The statistics for age
changed a minimal amount with an average age of 36.94, standard deviation of 17.07,
skew of .61, and a kurtosis of -1.04.
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Table 6
Cases with Missing Data
Case
7
12
34
50
72
75
85
100
102
115
116
123
126
128
156
161
166
182

# Missing
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
8
1
18
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

% Missing
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
17
2.1
38.3
6.4
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.1

Table 7
Final Sample Characteristics
Variable
Gender
Male
Female

Frequency

Percent (%)

95
89

51.6
48.4

Education
Less Than High School
High School or Equiv.
Some College
Career Training
2 Year Degree
4 Year Degree
Master’s Degree
Doctorate Degree
Professional Degree

1
15
82
8
39
22
13
2
2

0.5
8.2
44.6
4.3
21.2
12.0
7.1
1.1
1.1

Primary Operating System
Windows XP
Windows Vista
Windows 7
Apple OS X
Linux
UNIX

58
55
38
30
3
-

31.5
29.9
20.7
16.3
1.6
-
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Replacing Missing Values
After the two cases with excessive missing values were removed, a second
missing data analysis revealed that the remaining missing values were Missing
Completely At Random (MCAR) based on the results of the Little’s MCAR test: chisquare = 548.208, df = 535, Sig = .337. This indicates that using the missing data
replacement options available in the Missing Data Analysis module would be
appropriate. The Estimation-Maximization (EM) method was used to replace missing
values. Once these values were replaced, descriptive statistics were computed on the
questions contained in the survey. Descriptive statistics for these items variables are
available in Table 8.
The descriptive statistics show that for each variable, the range of responses
covered the entire range of possible choices. The only exception is with CUE2, which
had a lowest response of 2. Values below the scale minimum of 1 were observed with
SSU3 and SEF3. This is due to the missing value estimation-maximization replacement
method employed.
Construct Validity and Reliability
The following section discusses the results of the analysis to determine the
adequacy of questions used to formulate the constructs found in the model. In this section
the results for the tests of scale reliability using Chronbach’s alpha and construct validity
using factor analysis will be reported. Once the reliability and validity of the items used
in the constructs has been established, and the single measures of the constructs
computed, the data will be ready to test the hypotheses.
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Table 8
Item Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Item

Min

Max

Mean

St. Dev.

Skew

St. Err

Kurtosis

St. Err.

Vulnerability

VUL1
VUL2
VUL3
VUL4
VUL5
VUL6
VUL7
VUL8

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000

3.886
3.326
3.777
3.681
3.777
3.717
3.848
4.245

1.842
1.670
1.832
1.620
1.861
1.773
1.941
1.858

0.085
0.503
0.118
0.224
0.083
0.121
0.018
-0.192

0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179

-1.179
-0.805
-1.277
-0.844
-1.214
-1.016
-1.261
-1.142

0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356

Severity

SEV1
SEV2
SEV3
SEV4
SEV5
SEV6
SEV7
SEV8

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000

4.924
5.418
5.128
6.275
5.141
4.870
4.842
4.859

1.517
1.534
1.618
1.360
1.663
1.677
1.667
1.673

-0.659
-1.171
-0.879
-2.488
-0.753
-0.628
-0.735
-0.743

0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179

-0.125
1.000
0.084
6.108
-0.341
-0.444
-0.275
-0.273

0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356

Benefits

BEN1
BEN2
BEN3
BEN4
BEN5
BEN6
BEN7
BEN8

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000

5.033
4.615
4.799
4.357
4.764
4.653
4.902
4.845

1.305
1.409
1.312
1.446
1.377
1.470
1.407
1.407

-1.030
-0.616
-0.737
-0.326
-0.748
-0.611
-0.861
-0.803

0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179

0.436
-0.247
0.153
-0.764
-0.084
-0.383
0.194
0.067

0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356

Barriers

BAR1
BAR2
BAR3
BAR4

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000

4.799
3.768
3.800
3.622

1.767
1.779
1.724
1.648

-0.669
0.020
0.017
0.165

0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179

-0.557
-1.196
-1.148
-0.892

0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356

Cues to Action

CUE1
CUE2
CUE3
CUE4

1.000
2.000
1.000
1.000

7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000

4.946
5.272
4.826
5.371

1.632
1.247
1.460
1.306

-0.888
-0.785
-0.778
-0.983

0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179

-0.001
0.377
0.040
0.894

0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356

Computer Security Usage

SSU1
SSU2
SSU3

1.000
1.000
0.187

7.000
7.000
7.000

4.750
4.399
4.637

2.158
2.356
2.144

-0.467
-0.276
-0.457

0.179
0.179
0.179

-1.172
-1.487
-1.094

0.356
0.356
0.356

Self-Efficacy

SEF1
SEF2
SEF3
SEF4

1.000
1.000
0.693
1.000

7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000

4.451
4.921
4.356
4.560

1.804
1.864
1.934
1.812

-0.369
-0.643
-0.255
-0.316

0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179

-0.885
-0.679
-1.181
-0.943

0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356

Prior Experience

PXP1
PXP2
PXP3

1.000
1.000
1.000

7.000
7.000
7.000

2.332
2.609
2.870

1.098
1.589
1.751

1.187
1.308
0.609

0.179
0.179
0.179

1.852
1.067
-0.684

0.356
0.356
0.356
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The research model contains six independent variables, four moderating variables,
and the dependent variable. The composite variables in the model are all designed to be
reflective in nature. The composite variables in the research model include all
independent variables (Vulnerability, Severity, Benefits, Barriers, Self-efficacy, and Cues
to Action), the moderating variable of Prior Experience, and the dependent variable,
Computer Security Usage.
Reliability Analysis
A reliability analysis of the items in the constructs was conducted using the Scale
module of SPSS to verify that the scales constructed provided a reliable measure of the
constructs they were intended to measure. During this process items in the perceived
barriers, cues to action, and severity construct were identified as potential problems. The
scale reliability of perceived barriers would be improved from 0.745 to 0.792 with the
removal of BAR1. The scale reliability of cues to action would be improved from 0.751
to 0.779 with the removal of CUE2. And finally, the scale reliability of perceived severity
would be improved from 0.946 to 0.950 with the removal of SEV4. The items CUE2 and
BAR1 were removed to improve the reliability of their respective scales. However, item
SEV4 was retained because the removal of this item would only improve Cronbach’s
alpha for the perceived severity scale by 0.004. After removal of CUE2 and BAR 1, the
final scale reliability for all constructs ranged from 0.703 to 0.951, indicating that the
subscales have good reliability. The reliability analysis can be found in Table 9.
Reliability of the final combined constructs after removal of BAR1 and CUE2 can be
found in Table 10.
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Table 9
Reliability Analysis
Vulnerability
VUL1
VUL2
VUL3
VUL4
VUL5
VUL6
VUL7
VUL8
Severity
SEV1
SEV2
SEV3
SEV4
SEV5
SEV6
SEV7
SEV8
Benefits
BEN1
BEN2
BEN3
BEN4
BEN5
BEN6
BEN7
BEN8
Barriers
BAR1
BAR2
BAR3
BAR4
Cues to Action
CUE1
CUE2
CUE3
CUE4
Computer Security Usage
SSU1
SSU2
SSU3
Self Efficacy
SEF1
SEF2
SEF3
SEF4
Prior Experience
PXP1
PXP2
PXP3

Cronbach’s α
.951

α if Item Deleted
.942
.948
.939
.951
.941
.943
.948
.943

.946
.937
.941
.934
.950
.937
.943
.935
.934
.934
.926
.924
.919
.930
.921
.927
.927
.927
.745
.792
.718
.614
.703
.751
.620
.779
.594
.733
.900
.865
.893
.816
.949
.938
.934
.925
.936
.703
.581
.583
.685
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Table 10
Scale Reliability
Construct
Perceived Vulnerability
Perceived Severity
Perceived Benefits
Perceived Barriers
Cues to Action
Self Efficacy
Prior Experience
Computer Security Usage

Number of Items
8
8
8
3
3
4
3
3

Cronbach's Alpha
0.951
0.946
0.934
0.792
0.779
0.949
0.703
0.900

Construct Validity
An exploratory factor analysis using the principal component extraction method
(varimax rotation with Eigenvalues greater than 1) was conducted using the Data
Reduction module of SPSS. This analysis ensures that items load correctly on the
constructs to which they are intended to load and do not cross load to other constructs.
Results of this analysis can be found in Table 11.
The result of the final factor analysis was an eight-factor solution in which all
factors load cleanly on their intended constructs. All item loadings were higher than 0.7.
except PXP3 (0.692), which measures the individual’s perceived severity of previous
security attacks. Items with construct loadings lower than 0.7 are often deleted at this
stage of a factor analysis unless removal of the construct would threaten content validity.
The interaction of Prior Experience and Severity hypothesized in this study is dependent
on this question being present in the construct. Therefore PXP3 was retained in the final
Prior Experience construct. The eight factors accounted for 75.7% of the total variance.
A summary of the factor contributions to the overall variance can be found in Table 12.
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Table 11
Factor Loadings

VUL1
VUL2
VUL3
VUL4
VUL5
VUL6
VUL7
VUL8
SEV1
SEV2
SEV3
SEV4
SEV5
SEV6
SEV7
SEV8
BEN1
BEN2
BEN3
BEN4
BEN5
BEN6
BEN7
BEN8
BAR2
BAR3
BAR4
CUE1
CUE3
CUE4
SSU1
SSU2
SSU3
SEF1
SEF2
SEF3
SEF4
PXP1
PXP2
PXP3

VUL
.853
.804
.901
.775
.872
.841
.834
.861
.150
.169
.131
.159
.111
.070
.140
.146
-.055
.011
.056
.104
-.056
-.038
-.032
-.015
.013
-.049
-.033
.095
.042
.013
.193
.069
.172
-.060
.023
-.040
-.028
.280
.178
.149

SEV
.087
.126
.131
.207
.142
.146
.083
.163
.859
.774
.891
.683
.868
.810
.848
.860
.193
.075
.093
.025
.084
.130
.121
.114
-.064
-.157
-.059
.172
.177
.174
-.013
.055
.099
-.096
.029
-.073
-.073
-.024
.076
.253

BEN
.024
.006
.043
-.074
.045
.027
.015
-.095
.128
.115
.113
-.054
.080
.137
.190
.182
.788
.808
.887
.762
.850
.780
.822
.822
-.029
-.157
-.195
.133
.101
.091
.142
.026
.094
.065
.067
.077
.072
-.156
-.041
-.010

Factor
BAR
CUE
-.008
-.052
.060
.080
-.039
-.066
.074
-.044
-.109
.015
-.037
.115
-.023
.052
-.009
.089
-.038
.053
-.110
.165
-.062
.078
-.151
.007
-.017
.086
-.015
.037
.045
.136
.038
.122
-.141
.054
-.209
.066
-.092
.069
-.064
.177
-.181
.066
-.056
.152
.164
-.077
.144
-.104
.742
.187
.815
.122
.796
.076
.137
.796
.144
.834
.096
.707
-.209
.016
.042
.066
-.065
.007
-.131
-.033
-.054
-.091
-.068
-.070
-.072
-.046
.074
-.051
.058
.053
.094
-.012

SSU
.107
.065
.114
.062
.120
.085
-.020
.018
-.011
.037
.034
-.061
.040
-.035
.129
.113
.064
.057
.030
.070
.087
.175
-.083
-.070
.127
-.224
-.170
.039
.029
.019
.842
.903
.888
.120
.057
.080
.049
.014
.113
.074

SEF
-.026
-.116
-.036
-.025
-.062
.010
.042
.074
.049
-.035
-.075
-.040
-.064
.076
-.107
-.088
.033
.078
.035
.041
-.004
-.005
.094
.066
-.095
-.093
-.145
-.093
-.071
-.073
.100
.097
.110
.898
.922
.931
.914
-.022
.106
-.130

PXP
.272
.082
.189
-.163
.137
.162
.019
.099
.015
.101
-.003
.115
-.031
.011
.084
.085
-.064
-.097
.000
-.019
.012
.048
-.026
-.095
.002
.089
.158
.163
.037
-.199
.075
.039
.101
-.034
-.003
.014
-.013
.761
.790
.692
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Table 12
Factor Analysis Variance Explained
Factor
Vulnerability
Severity
Benefits
Self-Efficacy
Computer Security Usage
Barriers
Cues to Action
Prior Experience

Total
9.080
6.193
4.506
3.179
2.335
2.168
1.676
1.150

Initial Eigenvalues
Variance %
Cumulative
22.699
22.699
15.481
38.180
11.264
49.444
7.947
57.391
5.838
63.229
5.421
68.650
4.189
72.839
2.876
75.715

After verifying that scale reliability and construct validity were acceptable, the
items for each factor were combined into a single factor score. The descriptive statistics
shown in Table 21 illustrates that for many constructs, the range of the data covered the
entire range of possible values (1 to 7). The only exceptions were Cues to Action, which
had a lowest value of 1.67, Computer Security Usage, which had a lowest value of 0.836,
and Prior Experience, which had a maximum value of 6. Skewness ranged from -0.963 to
0.491, and kurtosis ranged from -1.054 to 0.606. When using the more liberal acceptable
value of ±1.00 for skewness and kurtosis, the data presented in Table 13 shows that the
data is fairly normally distributed.
Table 13
Construct Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Vulnerability
Severity
Benefits
Barriers
Cues to Action
Self Efficacy
Prior Experience
Computer Security Usage

Min
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.670
1.000
1.000
0.836

Max
7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000
7.000
6.000
7.000

Mean
3.782
5.182
4.746
3.730
5.048
4.572
2.603
4.595

St. Dev.
1.556
1.358
1.152
1.444
1.226
1.728
1.192
2.028

Skew
0.099
-0.963
-0.627
0.026
-0.657
-0.416
0.491
-0.393

St. Err.
0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179
0.179

Kurtosis
-1.046
0.606
0.142
-0.728
-0.083
-0.832
-0.184
-1.054

St. Err.
0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356
0.356
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Hypothesis Testing
To test the hypotheses outlined in Chapter III, a multiple regression analysis was
conducted using SPSS with non-dichotomous variables mean-centered prior to the
regression analysis. The regression was conducted using a hierarchical two-step method.
In the first step, the dependent variable computer security usage was regressed on the
independent variables of perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, perceived benefits,
perceived barriers, self-efficacy, and cues to action to examine the main effects of the
independent variables. The hypothesized moderating variables of gender, age, education,
and prior experience, and the hypothesized two-way interactions between these
moderating variables and the independent variables of vulnerability, severity, benefits,
barriers, and self-efficacy were added to the regression in step two. The overall fit of the
regression models can be seen in Table 14. Results of the regression can be seen in Table
15. Collinearity diagnostics conducted during the regression indicate that
multicollinearity for this regression is not a major concern. Tolerance scores were all
above 0.01 with the lowest score 0.27, and VIF scores were all below 10 with a highest
score of 3.702.
Overall, the research model explains 30.4% (adj. R2 = 0.167) of the variance in
the dependent variable, computer security usage. The main effects of vulnerability,
severity, benefits, barriers, self-efficacy, and cues to action account for 14% (adj. R2 =
0.111) of the explained variance, while the moderating variables gender, age, education,
prior experience, and the hypothesized two-way effects account for 16.4% (adj. R2 =
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Table 14
Regression Model Fit
Model
R
R2
Adj. R2
1
.375
.140***
.111
2
.551
.304***
.167
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001

SE Est.
1.912
1.851

ΔR2
.140
.164

Change Statistics
F Change
df1
df2
4.814
6
177
1.499
24
153

Sig. F Change
.000
.075

Table 15
Hierarchical Regression
Model
1

2

Predictor
Vulnerability
Severity
Benefits
Barriers
Self-efficacy
Cues to Action

Vulnerability
Severity
Benefits
Barriers
Self-efficacy
Cues to Action
Gender
Age
Education
Prior Experience
Gender*Vulnerability
Gender*Severity
Gender*Benefits
Gender*Barriers
Gender*Self-efficacy
Age*Vulnerability
Age*Severity
Age*Benefits
Age*Barriers
Age*Self-efficacy
Education*Vulnerability
Education*Severity
Education*Benefits
Education*Barriers
Education*Self-efficacy
Prior Experience*Vulnerability
Prior Experience*Severity
Prior Experience*Benefits
Prior Experience*Barriers
Prior Experience*Self-efficacy
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01

B
.289
-.002
.133
-.221
.201
.189
.182
.081
.017
-.190
.279
.114
.236
.015
.105
.361
.077
-.281
.203
-.099
-.031
-.010
-.004
-.002
-.016
-.002
-.050
.033
-.222
.089
.084
-.115
-.299
.082
-.084
-.202

Coefficients
SE B
.094
.120
.134
.109
.086
.131
.138
.194
.189
.157
.147
.136
.320
.010
.098
.150
.194
.255
.286
.220
.190
.007
.007
.008
.007
.005
.068
.079
.090
.068
.064
.083
.128
.133
.092
.081

β
.226
-.001
.075
-.157
.171
.114

Sig
.002**
.987
.321
.044*
.021*
.151

.142
.054
.010
-.135
.238
.069
.058
.122
.083
.212
.041
-.134
.075
-.047
-.018
-.123
-.054
-.020
-.183
-.023
-.059
.034
-.188
.100
.105
-.108
-.219
.054
-.076
-.211

.189
.677
.927
.229
.060
.403
.461
.140
.286
.017*
.692
.272
.480
.654
.873
.141
.538
.795
.021*
.773
.466
.680
.015*
.191
.187
.168
.021*
.537
.362
.014*

Collinearity Statistics
Tolerance
VIF
.903
1.108
.752
1.330
.845
1.183
.812
1.231
.909
1.100
.779
1.283
.390
.270
.395
.362
.289
.675
.730
.669
.752
.588
.425
.307
.407
.408
.345
.656
.596
.748
.731
.739
.698
.684
.780
.794
.720
.753
.513
.609
.664
.634

2.561
3.702
2.530
2.762
3.464
1.481
1.370
1.495
1.329
1.700
2.353
3.257
2.456
2.450
2.897
1.524
1.678
1.336
1.367
1.354
1.433
1.463
1.282
1.260
1.389
1.328
1.948
1.641
1.505
1.578
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0.056) of the variance in computer security usage. In the model 1 regression analysis, the
main effects of vulnerability, severity, benefits, barriers, self-efficacy, and cues to action,
were tested (H1-H6).
H1, which predicted that perceived vulnerability would be positively related to
computer security usage, was supported (β = 0.226, p = 0.002). H2, which predicted that
perceived severity would be positively related to computer security usage, was not
supported (β = -0.001, p = 0.987, n.s.). H3, which predicted that perceived benefits would
be positively related to computer security usage, was not supported (β = 0.075, p = 0.321,
n.s.). H4, which predicted that perceived barriers would be negatively related to computer
security usage, was supported (β = -0.157, p = 0.044). H5, which predicted that selfefficacy with computer security would be positively related to computer security usage,
was supported (β = 0.171, p = 0.021). H6, which predicted that cues to action would be
positively related to computer security usage, was not supported (β = 0.114, p = 0.151,
n.s.).
In model 2, the research hypotheses H7a-e, H8a-e, H9a-e, and H10a-e were tested
along with the main effects of the moderating variables. These moderators were not
hypothesized to be significantly related to computer security usage.
Hypotheses H7a-e, which predicted that gender would have a significant
moderating effect with vulnerability, severity, benefits, barriers, and self-efficacy were
not supported (H7a, β = 0.041, p = 0.692, n.s.; H7b, β = -0.134, p = 0.272, n.s.; H7c, β =
0.075, p = 0.480, n.s.; H7d, β = -0.047, p = 0.654, n.s.; H7e, β = -0.018, p = 0.873, n.s.).
The main effect of gender on computer security usage was also non-significant (β =
0.058, p = 0.461, n.s.).
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Hypotheses H8a-e, which predicted that age would have a significant moderating
effect with vulnerability, severity, benefits, barriers, and self-efficacy, only H8d was
supported (H8a, β = -0.123, p = 0.141, n.s.; H8b, β = -0.054, p = 0.538, n.s.; H8c, β =
-0.020, p = 0.795, n.s.; H8d, β = -0.183, p = 0.021; H8e, β = -0.023, p = 0.773, n.s.). The
main effect of age on computer security usage was non-significant (β = 0.122, p = 0.140,
n.s.).
The interaction of age with barriers on computer security usage shows that when
age is low (-2 SD), perceived barriers has a positive relationship with computer security
usage. The simple slope of the line (0.146, p = 0.372, two-tailed) indicates that for each
increase of one standard deviation (SD) in perceived barriers, computer security usage
goes up by a corresponding score of 0.146 SD. This is not consistent with the hypothesis
that perceived barriers is negatively related to computer security usage, however the
significance of the simple slope indicates the effect of perceived barriers on computer
security usage when age is low is not significant. However, when age is high (+2 SD), the
simple slope of the line takes on a negative value (-0.563 p = 0.001, two-tailed),
indicating that for each increase in one SD of perceived barriers, the corresponding value
of computer security decreases by 0.563 standard deviations. This result would indicate
that perceived barriers is more relevant for older users. The graph of the interaction
effects of age with barriers on computer security usage can be found in Figure 17. The
full interaction analysis for age with barriers can be found in Appendix D.
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Figure 17. Two-way interaction of age and perceived barriers.

Hypotheses H9a-e, which predicted that education would have a significant
moderating effect with vulnerability, severity, benefits, barriers, and self-efficacy, only
H9c was supported (H9a, β = -0.059, p = 0.466, n.s.; H9b, β = 0.034, p = 0.680, n.s.;
H9c, β = -0.188, p = 0.015; H9d, β = 0.100, p = 0.191, n.s.; H9e, β = 0.105, p = 0.187,
n.s.). The main effect of education on computer security usage was non-significant (β =
0.083, p = 0.286, n.s.).
The interaction of education with benefits on computer security usage shows that
when education is low (-2 SD), perceived benefits has a positive relationship with
computer security usage. The simple slope of the line (0.328 p = 0.049, two-tailed)
indicates that for each increase of one standard deviation (SD) in perceived benefits,
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computer security usage goes up by a corresponding score of 0.328 SD. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that perceived benefits is positively related to computer security
usage. However, when education is high (+2 SD), the simple slope of the line takes on a
negative value (-0.087, p = 0.633, two-tailed), indicating that for each increase in one SD
of perceived benefits, the corresponding value of computer security decreases by 0.087
standard deviations. While this is not consistent with the hypothesis that perceived
benefits is positively related to computer security usage, the significance of the slope
indicates that the effect of benefits on computer security usage for those with higher
education is not significant. This result would indicate that perceived benefits is more
relevant for those with less education. While it would be expected that higher levels of
education would result in higher levels of perceived benefits of usage of computer
security software, this was not indicated. This would indicate that the perceived benefits
are of less importance to those with higher levels of education and other motivating
factors influence adoption behavior for this group of respondents. The graph of the
interaction effects of education with benefits on computer security usage can be found in
Figure 18. The full interaction analysis for prior education with benefits can be found in
Appendix E.
Hypotheses H10a-e, which predicted that prior experience would have a
significant moderating effect with vulnerability, severity, benefits, barriers, and selfefficacy, only hypotheses H10b and H10e were supported (H10a, β = -0.108, p = 0.168,
n.s.; H10b, β = -0.219, p = 0.021, p < 0.05; H10c, β = 0.054, p = 0.537, n.s.; H10d, β =
-0.076, p = 0.362, n.s.; H10e, β = -0.211, p = 0.014). Additionally, the main effect of
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Figure 18. Two-way interaction of education and perceived benefits.
prior experience on computer security usage was found to be significant (β = 0.212, p =
0.017).
The interaction of prior experience with severity on computer security usage
shows that when prior experience with security incidents is low (-2 SD), perceived
severity has a positive relationship with computer security usage. The simple slope of the
line (0.293, p = 0.08, two-tailed) indicates that for each increase of one standard deviation
(SD) in perceived severity, computer security usage goes up by a corresponding score of
0.293 SD. This is consistent with the hypothesis that perceived severity is positively
related to computer security usage. However, when prior experience is high (+2 SD), the
simple slope of the line takes on a negative value (-0.146, p = 0.46, two-tailed), indicating
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that for each increase in one SD of perceived severity, the corresponding value of
computer security decreases by 0.146 standard deviations.
While this is not consistent with the hypothesis that perceived severity is
positively related to computer security usage, the significance of the slopes indicates that
the effect of perceived severity on computer security usage for those with high or low
prior experience with security incidents is not significant. The graph of the interaction
effects of prior experience with severity on computer security usage can be found in
Figure 19. The full interaction analysis for prior experience with severity can be found in
Appendix F.
The interaction of prior experience with self-efficacy on computer security usage
shows that when prior experience with security incidents is low (-2 SD), self-efficacy has
a positive relationship with computer security usage. The simple slope of the line (0.363,
p = 0.02, two-tailed) indicates that for each increase of one standard deviation (SD) in
self-efficacy, computer security usage goes up by a corresponding score of 0.3633 SD.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that self-efficacy is positively related to computer
security usage. When prior experience is high (+2 SD), the simple slope of the line
displays a non-significant positive value (0.023, p = 0.886, two-tailed), indicating that for
each increase in one SD of perceived severity, the corresponding value of computer
security increases by only 0.023 standard deviations. While this is consistent with the
hypothesis that perceived self-efficacy is positively related to computer security usage,
the significance of the slope indicates that the effect of self-efficacy on computer security
usage is relatively flat for those with higher prior experience with computer security
incidents.
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Figure 19. Two-way interaction of prior experience and perceived severity.
The effect of self-efficacy on computer security usage appears to be more relevant
with those who have been attacked less often, less severely, and not as recently. The
graph of the interaction effects of prior experience with self-efficacy on computer
security usage can be found in Figure 20. The full interaction analysis for prior
experience with self-efficacy can be found in Appendix G.
Post Hoc Power Analysis
Overall, only 7 of 26 hypotheses were supported during the analysis of the
research model. A post hoc power analysis using a statistical calculator provided at
danielsoper.com was conducted using an alpha level of .05, 30 predictors in model, an R2
of 0.304, and a sample size of 184. This analysis revealed that the power for the
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Figure 20. Two-way interaction of prior experience and self-efficacy.
regression in this research is 0.9999. This is significantly higher than the recommended
minimum of 0.8, indicating that the sample size for testing the regression was sufficient
to find even a small effect size (Soper, 2010). The effect size for the regression of the full
model is a Cohen ƒ2 value of 0.437. By convention, ƒ2 effect sizes of 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35
are termed small, medium, and large, respectively where ƒ2 = R2 / (1 - R2) (Cohen, 1988).
This would seem to indicate that while only seven hypotheses were supported, this was
not due to an issue with sampling power.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
This chapter examines the findings of this study in relationship to the initial
objectives. This chapter contains three main sections; contributions to the body of
research, limitations of this research study, and concludes with possible directions for
future research in this area.
Summary of the Study
The primary purpose of this research was to examine the adoption process of
computer security software in the home computer environment. The current models of
adoption used in IS research lacked perceptions of fear that could motivate an individual
to use computer security software. When exploring this lack of fear as motivation, the
option of adding the perceived vulnerability and perceived severity of a computer
incident to an existing model was explored. Upon further research, the discovery of the
Health Belief Model, which already offered these constructs in the context of
preventative healthcare behaviors, offered an avenue of research that few had ventured.
The use of the Health Belief Model as a framework to design a model to examine home
user adoption of computer security provided the basis for this research.
This research utilized a web-based survey to test the theoretical model derived
from the Health Belief Model. Based on the literature review, a questionnaire was
developed and administered on-line. The survey targeted individuals who are responsible
for the selection, installation, and maintenance of software on their home computers.
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The research model contains a total of 26 hypothetical relationships that were
tested using multiple regression analysis techniques and explains 30.4% of the variance
in computer security usage. The results demonstrate that certain constructs found in the
Health Belief Model are more effective than others in motivating individuals to utilize
computer security software. The results show that perceptions of vulnerability to attack
significantly influence individuals’ use of security software (H1). The belief in the
probability of a security incident was found to be the to be the most significant of the
main predictors in the research model. The assertion in this research that the fear belief of
the possibility of a security incident provided the foundation for creating the research
model. The significance of this variable accomplishes one of the major goals of this
research study. This was to show that individual fear beliefs can be significant
contributors to behavior. The current IS research models lack the explicit inclusion of
such fear beliefs.
Perceived barriers to implementation were found to have a significant negative
influence on computer security usage (H4). The perceived self-efficacy in selecting,
installing and maintaining security software was found to have an influence on security
software usage (H5). These constructs have parallel usage in other models used in IS
research as discussed in Chapter II. That they were found to be significant in this research
model based on the HBM provides additional validation of their use in IS research.
Of the hypothesized moderating variables (gender, age, education, and prior
attack experience), experience with prior attacks significantly influences individuals’
perceptions, persuades them to take precautions, and also moderates the relationships
between perceived severity and security usage (H10b), and self-efficacy and security
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usage (H10e). Other moderating relationships were found with age and education. It was
found that age effectively moderates the relationship between perceived barriers and
security software usage (H8d). While education was found to effectively moderate the
relationship between perceived benefits and security software usage (H9c).
Two of the constructs in the research model were perceived severity and cues to
action. These constructs are not found in current IS models. While not found to be
significant predictors of computer security usage in this research, they still offer some
possible explanations of attitude that should be discussed.
Perceived Severity was found to have little relationship with the dependent
variable (β = -0.001, p = 0.987). While it was proposed that the level of severity would
have a positive relationship with usage, this was not found. However, examination of the
severity scores reported by respondents shows that perceived severity is important to
users, where the majority of users reported that a security incident on their computer
would be serious. The mean score for this variable was 5.2 on a scale of 1 to 7 with 1
being no impact and 7 being very high impact. While the importance of this variable to
the respondents was high, the impact of such an incident would only be realized should
the event actually occur. This likelihood of the occurrence was modeled in the perceived
vulnerability construct, which was shown to be a significant predictor of computer
security usage.
Cues to action in this study had a higher than expected mean score of 5.05 on a
seven point agree/disagree scale indicating that more users agreed than disagreed that
they would be more conscious about their own security status given the cues to action
measured. While there is no clear indication as to why this variable failed to attain
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significance (β = 0.114, p = 0.151), the cross sectional design used in this study may
provide a possible explanation of this variables relationship to the computer security
usage. The respondents could agree that the measured cues to actions would make them
more conscious of their own security status, but the usage would depend on them having
actually experienced the cues to action. This may not be the case with respondents that
had CUE scores that did not significantly, and positively, correlate with computer
security usage as H6 stated. A better method of measuring this construct would be to
determine if individuals had been exposed to one of these triggering events.
Contributions
The research model tested represents the first study to apply the HBM to study
computer security usage behavior in the home environment. The research model tested in
this study provides empirical evidence that the constructs contained in the HBM can be
used to examine this understudied area of computer security. The results of this research
also suggest that further evaluation of models based on the HBM may apply in the study
of computer security adoption in the home.
The testing of the model revealed the two most significant contributors to the
usage of computer security for this study were the perceived vulnerability of a security
incident and the prior experience with a security incident. These two constructs
corresponded significantly with each other (Pearson’s r = .372, p < .01). This suggests
that while both constructs are important factors in security adoption in the home, many of
the respondents that felt vulnerable had also experienced prior security problems. This
suggests that user education before an incident takes place could influence users
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perceptions of vulnerability and encourage security software usage thus reducing the
need for the influence of prior attacks to motivate security usage.
Implications for Research
The HBM provides a foundation for the study of the security behavior of
individual users that can be applied to both the home and organizational environments.
While this study represents the first attempt to use the HBM in the home environment to
study computer security usage, it also represents the second attempt to study individual
security usage behavior using the HBM. The study conducted by Ng and colleagues
(2009) was conducted in an organizational setting using email usage behavior as the
dependent variable. Ng and colleagues (2009) found similar results with perceived
vulnerability, perceived benefits and self-efficacy being the most significant antecedents
of behavior. While their model explained more variance than in this study (R2 = .593 vs
R2 = .372) the differences in the dependent variable may account for the increase in
explained variance. Similar to this study, Ng and colleagues (2009) discovered that the
cues to action construct was not a significant antecedent of usage behavior.
Implications for Practice
The practical applications of this research are limited due to the population
studied not being the intended audience of the study results. While from a practical
standpoint the results may not have a significant influence on current implementation
behavior in the home, it provides theoretical foundation for further model development
that can help us understand how to motivate individuals to protect their computer
systems. This motivation can take several forms. Recommendations for practice include
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user education where possible. The education of users to the reality of the constructs
found within the research model based on the HBM could significantly improve the
security posture of these individual users. Through targeted messages in the media,
classroom interaction, web based advertisements, email campaigns, and other methods of
disseminating public service announcements (PSA), the perceptions of vulnerability,
severity, and benefits could be increased. These messages could also be used to dispel
perceptions of barriers to implementation and increase self-efficacy by providing
instruction in how to properly implement computer security and maintain an update and
effective security posture. While these ads would best be initiated by independent sources
not tied to a commercial venture, increased advertising of the benefits of computer
security software by software solution vendors could still be beneficial to goal of
educating users to the realities of computer security threats.
Limitations
There are few studies that can be found without limitations of some sort. The
major limitation of this study is that the population of interest, being large and undefined,
resulted in the use of a non-probability method of data collection in order to distribute the
invitation to participate in the survey. Also, the anonymous nature of the data collection
and the inability to track invitations sent and resulting responses with the snowball
sampling method leads to the possibility of non-responder bias which is impossible to
measure in this study.
Another limitation is that the study used self-reported usage as a dependent
variable. This could result in a self-report bias in which the respondents answer the usage
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measures in a way that would make their usage appear higher than would be measured
through observation or experimentation.
And finally, the nature of the study is protecting home computers from online
threats. The use of an online survey limits the respondent pool to those that felt
comfortable completing the survey, creating a potential response bias. It may be possible
that for those that did not feel comfortable completing the survey that the model fit would
be better than observed in the results reported in Chapter V.
Future Research
This research provides a foundation for a number of future studies based upon the
results presented in Chapter V, and based on the limitations observed and other questions
brought up during the course of the research. An obvious addition to this study would be
a replication of the study in using different samples from the target population. There
were many hypotheses were not supported during the analysis of the data collected. Only
through replication will the value of these hypotheses to the research model be fully
known. Another sampling issue that could be addressed in future studies would be
obtaining a sample that is more representative of the target population thereby increasing
the generalizability of results obtained. In the study by Brown and Venkatesh (2005), the
sample was obtained through a marketing company and invitations were sent via postal
mail. The method employed by Brown and Venkatesh was utilized in this research,
however, the invitations were sent through email. The email campaign resulted in no
completed surveys as was reported in Chapter IV. It is apparent that the target population
has had significant exposure to the dangers of email threats and that email is not an
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appropriate method to solicit research participation into a sensitive study such as
computer security. Future researcher in this area should utilize postal invitations as it
provides a better method to establish the initial trust in the recruitment process.
This study used computer security usage through the application of anti-virus,
firewall, and anti-spyware software to evaluate the research model. However, future
applications of the model could be extended to the behaviors involved in opening
suspicious emails, using suspicious websites, file sharing, and other high-risk online
activities. And finally, the application of the HBM to the study of security adoption can
be extended beyond the home environment to study security adoption behavior in the
corporate environment.
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Good day:
My Name is Chet Claar, a doctoral candidate at Utah State University. I am writing to
request your help with an important project. As part of a research project at Utah State
University’s department of Management Information Systems, we are examining homecomputer security issues by conducting a survey of home computer owners to ask about
their experiences with computer security and the Internet.
You were selected to be part of this project because you may be a computer owner that
selects, installs, and maintains the software on your home-computer. We realize that you
time is valuable and we would like you to just take a few minutes to participate in this
brief web survey created by our researchers.
For more information and to complete the survey online, please go to the URL below:
http://www.surveyshare.com/survey/take/?sid=107660
Sincerely,
Chet L.Claar
Doctoral Candidate
Utah State University
Department of MIS
3515 Old Main Hill
Logan, UT 84322‐3515
Email: chet.claar@aggiemail.usu.edu
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########################## BEGIN INTERACTION ANALYSIS ##########################
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7:01:56 PM

Output generated by Interaction version 1.4.1903
Download the latest version at: http://www.danielsoper.com/Interaction
Copyright (c) 2006-2009 by Daniel S. Soper, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved.
******************************** MODEL SUMMARY *********************************
R:
R Square:
R Square Adjusted:
Standard Error of the Estimate:
R Square Contribution of the Interaction Term(s):
RESEARCH MODEL: Y =
+
+
+
WHERE: Y
X1
X2
B0

=
=
=
=

0.267076859
0.071330049
0.055852216
0.971672673
0.028513867
B1X1
B2X2
B3X1X2
B0
ZSSU
ZBAR
ZAGE
Regression constant

****************************** END MODEL SUMMARY *******************************

************************** MODEL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE **************************
Sum of
Squares
-----------Regression: 13.05339897
Residual: 169.9466010
Total: 183.0000000

Degrees
of Freedom
-----------3
180
183

Mean
Square
F
Significance
------------ ------------ -----------4.351132992 4.608529584 0.003924818
0.944147783

********************************** END ANOVA ***********************************

***************************** MODEL POWER ANALYSIS *****************************
Effect Size (f Square):
Noncentrality Parameter (Lambda):
Critical F:
Noncentral F:
Beta (Type II Error Rate):
Observed Power:

0.076808826
14.13282405
4.608529584
0.322364301
0.373588426
0.626411573

****************************** END POWER ANALYSIS ******************************

****************************** MODEL COEFFICIENTS ******************************

(Regression constant):
ZBAR:
ZAGE:
Interaction term:

B
------------0.01151595
-0.20851422
0.048294390
-0.17717134

Std Error
-----------0.071799955
0.072117935
0.071982015
0.075363293

95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
Lower Bound Upper Bound

t
------------0.16038939
-2.89129502
0.670923016
-2.35089708

Significance
-----------0.872752220
0.004303870
0.503120131
0.019798611

(Regression constant):
ZBAR:
ZAGE:
Interaction term:

------------0.15318330
-0.35080897
-0.09373217
-0.32586945
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-----------0.130151397
-0.06621947
0.190320959
-0.02847323

**************************** END MODEL COEFFICIENTS ****************************

****************************** INTERACTION LINE 1 ******************************
Moderator:
Level of the Moderator:
Simple Slope:
Intercept:
Standard Error of Simple Slope:
Degrees of Freedom:
t:
Significance of Simple Slope (two-tailed):
Significance of Simple Slope (one-tailed):

ZAGE
+2 Std Dev
-0.56285691
0.085072830
0.171037120
180
-3.29084655
0.001201937
0.000600968

Lower Bound Upper Bound
------------ -----------95% CI around the Simple Slope: -0.90035263 -0.22536120
********************************** END LINE 1 **********************************

****************************** INTERACTION LINE 2 ******************************
Moderator:
Level of the Moderator:
Simple Slope:
Intercept:
Standard Error of Simple Slope:
Degrees of Freedom:
t:
Significance of Simple Slope (two-tailed):
Significance of Simple Slope (one-tailed):

ZAGE
-2 Std Dev
0.145828464
-0.10810473
0.163050005
180
0.894378777
0.372313595
0.186156797

Lower Bound Upper Bound
------------ -----------95% CI around the Simple Slope: -0.17590683 0.467563760
********************************** END LINE 2 **********************************

**************************** DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ****************************

ZSSU:
ZBAR:
ZAGE:
Interaction term:

Mean
---------0.0000000
0.0000000
0.0000000
-0.064998

Std Dev
---------1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
0.9549018

N
---------184.00000
184.00000
184.00000
184.00000

Minimum
----------1.853088
-1.890322
-1.109219
-3.438482

Maximum
---------1.1855217
2.2641615
2.4631992
2.5394484

************************** END DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS **************************

********************************* CORRELATIONS *********************************
ZSSU
---------------------ZSSU: 1.000000000

ZBAR: -0.20125815
ZAGE: 0.061126639
Interaction term: -0.15612123

ZSSU:
ZBAR:
ZAGE:
Interaction term:

ZBAR
----------------------0.20125815
1.000000000
-0.06535413
-0.06154529

ZSSU:
ZBAR:
ZAGE:
Interaction term:

ZAGE
---------------------0.061126639
-0.06535413
1.000000000
0.004699213

ZSSU:
ZBAR:
ZAGE:
Interaction term:

Interaction term
----------------------0.15612123
-0.06154529
0.004699213
1.000000000

******************************* END CORRELATIONS *******************************
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########################## BEGIN INTERACTION ANALYSIS ##########################
Saturday, September 25, 2010

7:07:07 PM

Output generated by Interaction version 1.4.1903
Download the latest version at: http://www.danielsoper.com/Interaction
Copyright (c) 2006-2009 by Daniel S. Soper, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved.
******************************** MODEL SUMMARY *********************************
R:
R Square:
R Square Adjusted:
Standard Error of the Estimate:
R Square Contribution of the Interaction Term(s):
RESEARCH MODEL: Y =
+
+
+
WHERE: Y
X1
X2
B0

=
=
=
=

0.239395212
0.057310067
0.041598569
0.978979790
0.009084089
B1X1
B2X2
B3X1X2
B0
ZSSU
ZBEN
ZEDU
Regression constant

****************************** END MODEL SUMMARY *******************************

************************** MODEL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE **************************
Sum of
Squares
-----------Regression: 10.48774243
Residual: 172.5122575
Total: 183.0000000

Degrees
of Freedom
-----------3
180
183

Mean
Square
F
Significance
------------ ------------ -----------3.495914146 3.647651217 0.013761229
0.958401430

********************************** END ANOVA ***********************************

***************************** MODEL POWER ANALYSIS *****************************
Effect Size (f Square):
Noncentrality Parameter (Lambda):
Critical F:
Noncentral F:
Beta (Type II Error Rate):
Observed Power:

0.060794186
11.18613040
3.647651217
0.356060888
0.360897542
0.639102457

****************************** END POWER ANALYSIS ******************************

****************************** MODEL COEFFICIENTS ******************************

(Regression constant):
ZBEN:
ZEDU:
Interaction term:

B
-----------0.017033363
0.120416538
0.162230645
-0.10383172

Std Error
-----------0.073321023
0.073962343
0.073609853
0.078838355

t
-----------0.232312133
1.628079011
2.203925674
-1.31702044

Significance
-----------0.816556610
0.105237982
0.028784093
0.189487589

(Regression constant):
ZBEN:
ZEDU:
Interaction term:
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95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
Lower Bound Upper Bound
------------ ------------0.12763518 0.161701908
-0.02551738 0.266350461
0.016992216 0.307469075
-0.25938643 0.051722977

**************************** END MODEL COEFFICIENTS ****************************

****************************** INTERACTION LINE 1 ******************************
Moderator:
Level of the Moderator:
Simple Slope:
Intercept:
Standard Error of Simple Slope:
Degrees of Freedom:
t:
Significance of Simple Slope (two-tailed):
Significance of Simple Slope (one-tailed):

ZEDU
+2 Std Dev
-0.08724691
0.341494655
0.182401393
180
-0.47832372
0.633000255
0.316500127

Lower Bound Upper Bound
------------ -----------95% CI around the Simple Slope: -0.44716696 0.272673138
********************************** END LINE 1 **********************************

****************************** INTERACTION LINE 2 ******************************
Moderator:
Level of the Moderator:
Simple Slope:
Intercept:
Standard Error of Simple Slope:
Degrees of Freedom:
t:
Significance of Simple Slope (two-tailed):
Significance of Simple Slope (one-tailed):

ZEDU
-2 Std Dev
0.328079991
-0.30742792
0.165512774
180
1.982203440
0.048978245
0.024489122

Lower Bound Upper Bound
------------ -----------95% CI around the Simple Slope: 0.001485082 0.654674900
********************************** END LINE 2 **********************************

**************************** DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ****************************

ZSSU:
ZBEN:
ZEDU:
Interaction term:

Mean
---------0.0000000
0.0000000
0.0000000
0.1640477

Std Dev
---------1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
0.9269532

N
---------184.00000
184.00000
184.00000
184.00000

Minimum
----------1.853088
-3.252990
-1.949288
-3.665707

Maximum
---------1.1855217
1.9573484
3.0235935
3.1659834

************************** END DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS **************************

********************************* CORRELATIONS *********************************
ZSSU

ZSSU:
ZBEN:
ZEDU:
Interaction term:

---------------------1.000000000
0.158164147
0.176350077
-0.10031571

ZSSU:
ZBEN:
ZEDU:
Interaction term:

ZBEN
---------------------0.158164147
1.000000000
0.164944208
-0.11417068

ZSSU:
ZBEN:
ZEDU:
Interaction term:

ZEDU
---------------------0.176350077
0.164944208
1.000000000
0.059664925

ZSSU:
ZBEN:
ZEDU:
Interaction term:

Interaction term
----------------------0.10031571
-0.11417068
0.059664925
1.000000000

******************************* END CORRELATIONS *******************************
Total execution time: 0.1400 seconds.
Output generated by Interaction version 1.4.1903
Download the latest version at: http://www.danielsoper.com/Interaction
Copyright (c) 2006-2009 by Daniel S. Soper, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved.
########################### END INTERACTION ANALYSIS ###########################
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########################## BEGIN INTERACTION ANALYSIS ##########################
Saturday, September 25, 2010

7:11:38 PM

Output generated by Interaction version 1.4.1903
Download the latest version at: http://www.danielsoper.com/Interaction
Copyright (c) 2006-2009 by Daniel S. Soper, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved.
******************************** MODEL SUMMARY *********************************
R:
R Square:
R Square Adjusted:
Standard Error of the Estimate:
R Square Contribution of the Interaction Term(s):
RESEARCH MODEL: Y =
+
+
+
WHERE: Y
X1
X2
B0

=
=
=
=

0.224798458
0.050534347
0.034709919
0.982491771
0.009231793
B1X1
B2X2
B3X1X2
B0
ZSSU
ZSEV
ZPXP
Regression constant

****************************** END MODEL SUMMARY *******************************

************************** MODEL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE **************************
Sum of
Squares
-----------Regression: 9.247785510
Residual: 173.7522144
Total: 183.0000000

Degrees
of Freedom
-----------3
180
183

Mean
Square
F
Significance
------------ ------------ -----------3.082595170 3.193439187 0.024870339
0.965290080

********************************** END ANOVA ***********************************

***************************** MODEL POWER ANALYSIS *****************************
Effect Size (f Square):
Noncentrality Parameter (Lambda):
Critical F:
Noncentral F:
Beta (Type II Error Rate):
Observed Power:

0.053223986
9.793213507
3.193439187
0.377773822
0.352799362
0.647200637

****************************** END POWER ANALYSIS ******************************

****************************** MODEL COEFFICIENTS ******************************

(Regression constant):
ZSEV:
ZPXP:
Interaction term:

B
-----------0.023656101
0.073189132
0.186706970
-0.10975584

Std Error
-----------0.074604887
0.076319810
0.077139554
0.082963675

t
-----------0.317085152
0.958979487
2.420379174
-1.32293849

Significance
-----------0.751542432
0.338841292
0.016487236
0.187515588

(Regression constant):
ZSEV:
ZPXP:
Interaction term:
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95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
Lower Bound Upper Bound
------------ ------------0.12354561 0.170857816
-0.07739627 0.223774536
0.034504144 0.338909796
-0.27345014 0.053938467

**************************** END MODEL COEFFICIENTS ****************************

****************************** INTERACTION LINE 1 ******************************
Moderator:
Level of the Moderator:
Simple Slope:
Intercept:
Standard Error of Simple Slope:
Degrees of Freedom:
t:
Significance of Simple Slope (two-tailed):
Significance of Simple Slope (one-tailed):

ZPXP
+2 Std Dev
-0.14632254
0.397070043
0.197503414
180
-0.74086084
0.459743188
0.229871594

Lower Bound Upper Bound
------------ -----------95% CI around the Simple Slope: -0.53604237 0.243397278
********************************** END LINE 1 **********************************

****************************** INTERACTION LINE 2 ******************************
Moderator:
Level of the Moderator:
Simple Slope:
Intercept:
Standard Error of Simple Slope:
Degrees of Freedom:
t:
Significance of Simple Slope (two-tailed):
Significance of Simple Slope (one-tailed):

ZPXP
-2 Std Dev
0.292700813
-0.34975783
0.166449993
180
1.758490986
0.080363435
0.040181717

Lower Bound Upper Bound
------------ -----------95% CI around the Simple Slope: -0.03574344 0.621145071
********************************** END LINE 2 **********************************

**************************** DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ****************************

ZSSU:
ZSEV:
ZPXP:
Interaction term:

Mean
---------0.0000000
0.0000000
0.0000000
0.2155338

Std Dev
---------1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
0.9203401

N
---------184.00000
184.00000
184.00000
184.00000

Minimum
----------1.853088
-3.080067
-1.344965
-2.490858

Maximum
---------1.1855217
1.3388379
2.8495041
4.1425858

************************** END DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS **************************

********************************* CORRELATIONS *********************************
ZSSU

ZSSU:
ZSEV:
ZPXP:
Interaction term:

---------------------1.000000000
0.130332564
0.180474683
-0.07226356

ZSSU:
ZSEV:
ZPXP:
Interaction term:

ZSEV
---------------------0.130332564
1.000000000
0.216711659
-0.16514609

ZSSU:
ZSEV:
ZPXP:
Interaction term:

ZPXP
---------------------0.180474683
0.216711659
1.000000000
0.218717289

ZSSU:
ZSEV:
ZPXP:
Interaction term:

Interaction term
----------------------0.07226356
-0.16514609
0.218717289
1.000000000

******************************* END CORRELATIONS *******************************
Total execution time: 0.1400 seconds.
Output generated by Interaction version 1.4.1903
Download the latest version at: http://www.danielsoper.com/Interaction
Copyright (c) 2006-2009 by Daniel S. Soper, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved.
########################### END INTERACTION ANALYSIS ###########################
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########################## BEGIN INTERACTION ANALYSIS ##########################
Saturday, September 25, 2010

7:26:06 PM

Output generated by Interaction version 1.4.1903
Download the latest version at: http://www.danielsoper.com/Interaction
Copyright (c) 2006-2009 by Daniel S. Soper, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved.
******************************** MODEL SUMMARY *********************************
R:
R Square:
R Square Adjusted:
Standard Error of the Estimate:
R Square Contribution of the Interaction Term(s):
RESEARCH MODEL: Y =
+
+
+
WHERE: Y
X1
X2
B0

=
=
=
=

0.281857248
0.079443508
0.064100900
0.967418782
0.007343700
B1X1
B2X2
B3X1X2
B0
ZSSU
ZSEF
ZPXP
Regression constant

****************************** END MODEL SUMMARY *******************************

************************** MODEL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE **************************
Sum of
Squares
-----------Regression: 14.53816203
Residual: 168.4618379
Total: 183.0000000

Degrees
of Freedom
-----------3
180
183

Mean
Square
F
Significance
------------ ------------ -----------4.846054012 5.177966314 0.001867899
0.935899099

********************************** END ANOVA ***********************************

***************************** MODEL POWER ANALYSIS *****************************
Effect Size (f Square):
Noncentrality Parameter (Lambda):
Critical F:
Noncentral F:
Beta (Type II Error Rate):
Observed Power:

0.086299438
15.87909669
5.177966314
0.307558277
0.379209299
0.620790700

****************************** END POWER ANALYSIS ******************************

****************************** MODEL COEFFICIENTS ******************************

(Regression constant):
ZSEF:
ZPXP:
Interaction term:

B
------------0.00442960
0.193212544
0.174513034
-0.08491909

Std Error
-----------0.071414792
0.071780116
0.072908826
0.070865824

t
------------0.06202647
2.691727949
2.393578984
-1.19830813

Significance
-----------0.950609812
0.007771150
0.017701440
0.232355161

(Regression constant):
ZSEF:
ZPXP:
Interaction term:
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95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
Lower Bound Upper Bound
------------ ------------0.14533699 0.136477782
0.051584340 0.334840748
0.030657790 0.318368279
-0.22474332 0.054905136

**************************** END MODEL COEFFICIENTS ****************************

****************************** INTERACTION LINE 1 ******************************
Moderator:
Level of the Moderator:
Simple Slope:
Intercept:
Standard Error of Simple Slope:
Degrees of Freedom:
t:
Significance of Simple Slope (two-tailed):
Significance of Simple Slope (one-tailed):

ZPXP
+2 Std Dev
0.023374355
0.344596461
0.163190413
180
0.143233628
0.886265888
0.443132944

Lower Bound Upper Bound
------------ -----------95% CI around the Simple Slope: -0.29863799 0.345386708
********************************** END LINE 1 **********************************

****************************** INTERACTION LINE 2 ******************************
Moderator:
Level of the Moderator:
Simple Slope:
Intercept:
Standard Error of Simple Slope:
Degrees of Freedom:
t:
Significance of Simple Slope (two-tailed):
Significance of Simple Slope (one-tailed):

ZPXP
-2 Std Dev
0.363050734
-0.35345567
0.154432445
180
2.350870846
0.019811964
0.009905982

Lower Bound Upper Bound
------------ -----------95% CI around the Simple Slope: 0.058319872 0.667781596
********************************** END LINE 2 **********************************

**************************** DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ****************************

ZSSU:
ZSEF:
ZPXP:
Interaction term:

Mean
---------0.0000000
0.0000000
0.0000000
-0.052162

Std Dev
---------1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0291120

N
---------184.00000
184.00000
184.00000
184.00000

Minimum
----------1.853088
-2.067610
-1.344965
-4.157157

Maximum
---------1.1855217
1.4054114
2.8495041
2.6852099

************************** END DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS **************************

********************************* CORRELATIONS *********************************
ZSSU

ZSSU:
ZSEF:
ZPXP:
Interaction term:

---------------------1.000000000
0.189079123
0.180474683
-0.13062936

ZSSU:
ZSEF:
ZPXP:
Interaction term:

ZSEF
---------------------0.189079123
1.000000000
-0.05244772
-0.05743584

ZSSU:
ZSEF:
ZPXP:
Interaction term:

ZPXP
---------------------0.180474683
-0.05244772
1.000000000
-0.18417410

ZSSU:
ZSEF:
ZPXP:
Interaction term:

Interaction term
----------------------0.13062936
-0.05743584
-0.18417410
1.000000000

******************************* END CORRELATIONS *******************************
Total execution time: 0.1250 seconds.
Output generated by Interaction version 1.4.1903
Download the latest version at: http://www.danielsoper.com/Interaction
Copyright (c) 2006-2009 by Daniel S. Soper, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved.
########################### END INTERACTION ANALYSIS ###########################
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